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TIMOTmY L. HALL*
This Article considers the role of race-consciousness in promoting
educational diversity. It challenges the conclusion, most famously expressed by
Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
that consideration of race as one among a number of 'plus" factors in
admissions decisions satisfies strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
This challenge proceeds on two fronts. In the first place, the Article investigates
the purpose of using proxies such as race to achieve intellectual diversity rather
than a more direct attention to the viewpoints actually possessed by potential
members of academic communities. In the second place, the Article questions
why university admissions and hiring practices do not make a similar use of
religion as a proxy for intellectual diversity. The author suggests that
enthusiasm for racial, but not religious, proxies reflects a lack of enthusiasm
for the kind of marketplace of ideas often championed in First Amendment
cases and that this selective focus on race as a proxy for intellectual diversity
neither serves a conpelling interest nor is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty years ago, Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke' declared that the consideration of race as one
factor in a state medical school's admissions process was a permissible means
of achieving educational diversity. 2 Since then, race-conscious policies-both
relating to admissions and to faculty hiring-have become well-established
features of university life.3 These policies track a wider current of enthusiasm
for making various institutions of American public life "look like America." 4
* Associate Professor of Law and Mitchell, McNutt, Threadgill, Smith, & Sams
Lecturer in Law, University of Mississippi Law School; J.D., 1983, University of Texas
School of Law. I wish to thank Ronald Rychlak, Michael Hofheimer, Barbara Phillips
Sullivan, and Gary Myers for their comments on this Article, and the Lamar Order of the
University of Mississippi Law School for providing research support.
1 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2 See id. at 320. Diversity, according to Justice Powell "may bring... experiences,
outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip... graduates
to render with understanding their vital service to humanity." Id. at 314.
3 See LAURENCE H. TRmE, AmmCAN CONSmrTUTnONAL LAw 1529 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing Powell's opinion as having granted a safe harbor to the Harvard-like admissions
policies practiced by most American colleges and universities).
4 See CHRLSTOPImR EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WrIE: AFFMATIVE ACrION,
RACE, AND AmEuCAN VALUEs 135 (1996) ("It defies logic to suggest that we can overcome
America's color legacy and achieve racial justice without ensuring that... important
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Nevertheless, diversity policies continue to generate intense public controversy
and have recently experienced substantial political and judicial setbacks. 5
For example, in the summer of 1995, the California Board of Regents
ordered that preferential admissions on the basis of race be ceased at the state's
institutions of higher education. 6 The Board of Regents's action, momentous in
itself, was subsequently dwarfed by a more sweeping California constitutional
initiative, approved by California voters in November 1996 as an amendment to
the California constitution and referred to as the California Civil Rights
Initiative. The Initiative, which was upheld in the face of a constitutional
challenge,7 provides that "[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant
institutions 'look like America,' to use President Clinton's phrase.").
5 See, e.g., TERRY EASrLAND, ENDING AFFIRmAnvE ACTION: THE CASE FOR
COLORBLIND JusTncE (1996); NATHAN GLAZER, AFFRMATivE DisCIUMATION: ETHNIc
INEQuALrrY AND PuBic Porcy (Harv. Univ. Press 1987); PAUL C. ROBERTS & LAWRENCE
M. STRATTON, THE NEw COLOR LINE: How QuOTAs AND PRivLEGE DEsrROY DEMOCRACY
(1995); Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1312 (1986). The controversy surrounding race-conscious policies which are
designed to further educational diversity is a part of the controversy surrounding affirmative
action programs generally. For investigations of this wider controversy, see PAUL M.
SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAzzA, THE ScAR OF RACE 102-03 (1993) (recounting the results of
surveys concerning racial issues which emphasize white opposition to affirmative action
policies). To speak of "setbacks" in affirmative action may be to put too mild of a face on the
current matter. At least one opponent of affirmative action policies sees these political and
judicial events as the beginning of a demise rather than mere setbacks. See Charles W.
Collier, The New Logic of Affirmative Action, 45 DUKE L.J. 559, 574 (1995) ("Future
historians will probably view the years 1995-96 as the period when the preferential and
discriminatory practices of affirmative action began to end."). One supporter of affirmative
action policies characterizes these events as "the Second Deconstniction, a period of
stagnation and retrenchment following thirty years of significant gains ushered in by
affirmative action." Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the
Second Deconstruction, and Affinnative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 191, 194 (1997).
6 See Amy Wallace & Dave Lesher, UCRegents, in Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirmative
Action, L.A. TIMts, July 21, 1995, at Al. This decision, as might be expected, was subjected
to intense criticism. In the summer of 1996, the American Association of University
Professors issued a report criticizing the Board of Regents's decision, especially in light of the
decision's possibly detrimental effects on educational diversity. See California Regents Called
Hasty on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at B10. For a general survey of
issues regarding affirmative action in California, see DALE MAHARIDGE, THE COMiNG WHITE
MINORITY: CALIFORNIA's ERUPTIONS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE (1996).
7 In Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), the
Federal District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of this
provision, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit thereafter reversed the
preliminary injunction order after finding that there was no likelihood that the plaintiffs in the
action would prevail on their equal protection and preemption claims against the state
constitutional provision. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th
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preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting." 8
Of perhaps even greater importance are two recent appellate court
decisions concerning the use of race-conscious policies to promote educational
diversity. In Hopwood v. Texas,9 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit declared unconstitutional the race-conscious admissions program
of the University of Texas Law School. The Fifth Circuit panel determined, in
route to this conclusion, that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion was no longer
controlling authority and that the law school's asserted interest in educational
diversity was not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the race-conscious
admissions program. 10 Furthermore, the court held that the University of Texas
Law School lacked an adequate remedial justification for considering race in its
admissions process. 11 More recently, in Taxman v. Board of Education of the
Township of Piscataway,12 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a public school violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act13 when it considered race in the decision of which of two equally qualified
teachers to terminate. Although recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court has
approved voluntary affirmative action programs with remedial ends in Title VII
contexts, the Third Circuit determined that an interest in promoting educational
diversity was not sufficient grounds for race-conscious hiring or termination
decisions.14
There are, of course, possible justifications other than the importance of
fostering diversity that are urged to support race-conscious decisionmaking in
university admissions and in faculty hiring decisions. Such decisions might be
justified severally as being necessary: to remedy either specifically identified, or
more generally perceived, past social discrimination; to include individuals in
the academic environment who have traditionally been excluded; or to
distribute more equitably the social benefits and power attendant to membership
Cir. 1997). For a general discussion of this initiative, see Eugene Volokh, The California
Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1335 (1997).
8 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a).
9 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
10 See id. at 941-48.
11 See id. at 948-55. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently declined to review the
decision. See Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
12 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin).
14 See id. at 1557-63.
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in an academic community.15 Race-conscious policies may also be justified as
necessary to combat continued racism, whether accomplished deliberately in
contexts difficult to prove or whether engaged in unconsciously.16 What one
might characterize as a pure diversity argument contends that, without regard to
questions of past or present wrongs or the requirements of remediation, race-
consciousness may be justified as a way of including a diverse group of people
in public institutions. The educational variant of this diversity argument
suggests that race-consciousness is an appropriate aspect of attempts to enhance
the diversity of viewpoints and perspectives in educational institutions. 17
15 The commonly cited justifications for race-conscious preferences are the making of
reparations for past discriminatory treatment, the enhancement of some aspect of social
utility-such as the fostering of intellectual diversity, and the satisfaction of a notion of
distributive justice. See, e.g., Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?,
47 STAN. L. REv. 855, 856 (1995); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a
Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 569 (1984); Sheila Foster,
Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity", 1993 Wis. L.
REV. 105, 112. For the view that affirmative action programs further distributive justice, see
generally RONALD J. FIsCus, THE CONSTITUIYONAL LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1992).
See also John Martinez, Trivializing Diversity: The Problem of Overinclusion in Affirmative
Action Programs, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 49, 55 (1995). For the view that affirmative
action programs serve inclusive ends, see EDLEY, supra note 4, at 123-41; KENrrmH L.
KARsT, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIzENsHIP AND THE CONsnrUTION 167-72
(1989).
16 See RoY L. BROOKs, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?: A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 235-36 (1996) (suggesting the continued necessity of affirmative action programs
in higher education "to provide minorities and women with a measure of protection from
individual and institutional discrimination," and noting that "[flor all the talk of diversity,
professors still prefer students who look, talk, and think like them"); Collier, supra note 5, at
568-69 (discussing the use of affirmative action programs to offset prejudice against
minorities); EDLEY, supra note 4, at 125 (discussing the need for programs to combat the
tendency for social groups to prefer members of their own groups); Wendy Brown-Scott,
Unpacking the Affirmative Action Rhetoric, 30 WAKE FOREsT L. REy. 801, 806-07 (1995)
(stating that affirmative action policies are necessary to counteract continued stereotypes of
black inferiority).
17 In support of the perspective that race-conscious decisions are appropriate for a
university attempting to foster diversity, consider the following:
Because our public universities should be places where persons from different walks of
life and diverse backgrounds come together to talk with, to learn from, and to teach each
other, each person's unique background and life experience may be relevant in the
admissions process-thus, absolute color-blindness is not constitutionally required in the
education context.
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1745, 1746
(1996).
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The educational diversity justification has enjoyed a warm welcome among
many legal scholars 18 and within the institutional practices of law schools 19
because it offers some promise of evading what some legal commentators have
perceived to be disagreeable features of attempts to gear affirmative action
programs toward purely compensatory, or remedial, ends. The remedial focus
has been perceived as suffering at least three weaknesses. First, the remedial
focus is sometimes said to encumber its beneficiaries with a stigmatic badge of
inferiority.20 Second, the remedial focus relies on a nexus with specifically
18 For general approval of the diversity rationale for race-conscious admissions and
hiring decisions in educational institutions, see, e.g., Brest & Oshige, supra note 15, at 858;
Charles R. Calleros, Racial Integration of Legal Education: Making Progress and Redoubling
Efforts, NEWSLmrrER, Mar. 1996, at 7 (Association of American Law Schools); Duncan
Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 705; Carl C. Monk, Reaffirming the Need for Diversity at Law Schools, 138 NEw
JERSEY L.J. 210, Sept. 12, 1994, at 14 (1994). The U. S. Department of Justice has also
taken the position that the diversity rationale continues to be a viable justification for at least
some race-conscious programs. See Post-Adarand Guidance on Aff rmative Action in Federal
Employment, [Feb. 29, 1996] 34 GOv'T EMPL. REL. REP. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont) 369
(Mar. 11, 1996).
19 In January 1990 the House of Representatives of the American Association of Law
Schools (AALS) adopted a bylaw declaring that member schools should "seek to have a
fculty, staff, and student body which are diverse with respect to race, color, and sex."
AALS BYLAWs, art. VI, § 6-4(c) in ASSOCIATION OF AMEmCAN LAw ScHOOls,
ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 22 (1990). Professor Paul D. Carrington has suggested that most
law teachers support some degree of race-consciousness in academic decisions, but that those
teachers oppose prescribed goals and timetables. See Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992
UTAH L. REv. 1105, 1106-07. In the wake of the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood decision, the
President of the AALS reiterated the value of race-conscious policies designed to promote
educational diversity in law schools. See Wallace D. Loh, Diversity, NEwSLETIER, APR.
1996, at 1 (Association of American Law Schools).
For a study suggesting that the legal academy's professed commitment to affirmative
action policies has actually yielded only minor benefits for women and minorities, see
Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About
Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 199 (1997). But see Richard
A. White, The Gender and Minority Composition of New Law Teachers and AALS Faculty
Appointments Register Candidates, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 424, 429-30 (1994) (suggesting that
one-fifth to one-quarter of recent law school hires were minorities). For general commentary
concerning the inclusion of a greater number of women and minorities in law schools, see
Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part of a Perpetual First
Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799 (1988); Richard H.
Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School
Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 537 (1988).
2 0 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFL ONS OF AN AFFmATVE ACnON BABY 54
(1991) (arguing that affirmative action programs produce a "racialist assumption of
inferiority"). Of course, the same charge has been leveled against nonremedial justifications
1998]
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identified instances of past discrimination which tend to weaken the case for
remedial action as the passage of time blurs the nexus between past sin and
presently perceived innocence.21 Third, the remedial focus faces difficult
problems associated with the impact of remedial programs on "innocent"
bystanders.
The diversity rationale, however, seems to avoid the problem of "stigma"
by redefining the "beneficiaries" of race-conscious programs.2 2 The diversity
rationale asserts that all members of the educational community, and not just
the particular members admitted to promote this diversity, benefit from the
diversity of its members. 23 The diversity rationale defines admissions and hiring
for race-consciousness, including the diversity rationale. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that race-based classifications may stigmatize
groups singled out for differential treatment); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Unless [classifications based on race] are strictly reserved for
remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility."); Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1839, 1879-80
(1996) ("A conscious separation of racial diversity from every other sort of diversity implies
that members of targeted minority groups are too culturally impoverished to produce talent
spanning biology, history, and classics."); Foster, supra note 15, at 111 (asserting that the
diversity rationale as generally articulated stigmatizes minority groups). For a general
discussion of stigma as it relates to diversity programs, see Marty B. Lorenzo, Race-
Conscious Diversity Admissions Programs: Furthering a Compelling Interest, 2 MIcH. J.
RACE & L. 361 (1997). For the suggestion that the stigma often attributed to race-conscious
programs actually pre-exists these programs and is a feature of continued white racism, see,
e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular 2imes,
104 HARv. L. REV. 525, 542 (1990); Robin D. Barnes, Politics and Passion: Theoretically a
Dangerous Liaison, 101 YALE L.J. 1631, 1638 (1992) (reviewing STuEP-N L. CARTER,
REFLECrIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACrION BABY (1991), and PATRICIA J. WIInAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)).
21 See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 127. There has scarcely been a time when opponents of
race-conscious acts of remediation have not suggested that the victims of past discrimination
needed to simply "get over it":
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has
shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the
special favorite of the laws ....
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
22 See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 124-25; Rodney A. Smolla, Affirmative Action in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 44 ARK. L. REv. 935, 935-36 (1991).
23 See Amar & Katyal, supra note 17, at 1749; Richard Delgado, Five Months Later
(The Trial Court Opinion), 71 Thx. L. REv. 1011, 1015 (1993). Compare the U.S. Supreme
Court's similar suggestion regarding the interest in broadcast diversity used to justify the FCC
[Vol. 59:551
EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY
qualifications to include the possession of viewpoints or perspectives likely to
enrich an educational institution's academic discourse. Advocates of the
diversity rationale insist that this inclusion of diversity considerations within the
definition of admissions or hiring qualifications is not inconsistent with a focus
on merit. The diversity rationale simply suggests that merit may reside in other
features of an individual's background besides that individual's record of
academic achievement on standardized tests or in previous educational
environments. The diversity rationale posits that a perspective not widely
shared by other students or faculty is meritorious in an academic setting, just as
speed is meritorious in a foot race and balance is meritorious in the construction
of girders in tall buildings. Different practices emphasize different standards of
merit, and the diversity argument seeks to broaden the standard of merit
recognized within the practice of academic life.24 Conceived in this way, the
diversity rationale is comparable to existing preferences available to talented
athletes or to the children of alumni. 25 In both of these cases, characteristics
policies at issue in Metro Broadcasting: "The benefits of such diversity are not limited to the
members of minority groups who gain access to the broadcasting industry by virtue of the
ownership policies; rather, the benefits redound to all members of the viewing and listening
audience." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990), overnded by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
24 See Susan Stum & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affimative Action: Reclaning the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1996). The concept of merit has been the subject of
intense debate among legal academics. A number of scholars have argued that either there are
no objective standards available to define merit or that the concept of merit is used by
members of the majority to suppress the contributions of minorities. See, e.g., PATRICIA J.
WIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 103 (1991); Richard Delgado, Norms and
Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativty in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
933, 951 (1991); Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44
VAND. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1991); D. Kennedy, supra note 18, at 708; Gary Pellar, Race
Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L.J. 758, 806-07. For defenses of the concept of merit, see, e.g.,
Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "'hite Male" Standards: Some Lessons from the
Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065, 2080-85 (1991); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of
Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745, 1807 (1989). For the suggestion that the critique
of merit is anti-Semitic and possibly racist, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the
Radical Critique ofMerit Anti-Semitic?, 83 CAL. L. REV. 853 (1995).
25 See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affrmative Action, 83
GEo. L.J. 1711, 1728-29 (1995) (suggesting a variety of common deviations from the idea of
intellectual merit); Sanford Levinson, Hopwood. Some Reflections on Constitutional
Interpretation by an Inferior Court, 2 TEx. FORUM Clv. LtB. & Crv. R. 113, 114 (1996)
(discussing affirmative action for state residents and for the children of alumni at the
University of Texas Law School); Amar & Katyal, supra note 17, at 1749, suggest, in fact,
that affirmative action programs in university admissions may have the effect of partially
correcting "the racial skew of what are, quite literally, educational grandfather clauses-the
admissions preferences some schools award alumni offspring."
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other than intellectual achievement are brought to bear upon admissions
decisions. Institutions grant preferences to athletes and to the children of alumni
because these individuals bring with them characteristics advantageous to the
institution. If anything, preferences based on attempts to promote intellectual
diversity are more consistent with the academic missions of educational
institutions than preferences for athletes and for the children of alumni.
The focus on diversity has also been used to escape the temporal nexus
with the past that forms the crucial foundation for remedial uses of race-
consciousness.26 One could, of course, define the particularly valuable indicia
of diversity as the experience of past discrimination and thus re-introduce this
temporal nexus within the diversity context.27 But proponents of race-conscious
attempts to foster diversity seldom define the relevant part of diversity as the
experience of past discrimination. Instead, they focus attention on the value of
minority students in the educational process as a repository of experiences of
social discrimination.
Finally, the diversity rationale for race-conscious policies seems to avoid
the standard charge that affirmative action programs designed to remedy past
discrimination inevitably discriminate against innocent parties who had not
participated in the sins of the past and frequently benefit minorities who had not
been the victims of particular past discrimination. 28 Without a focus on legally
cognizable wrongs, there is no basis for invoking characterizations of
victimhood or status as an "innocent" bystander.
This Article considers whether the diversity rationale as originally
conceived by Justice Powell and as implemented today in educational
institutions is consistent with current equal protection doctrine. Crucial to
26 See Chen, supra note 20, at 1846 (referring to the "morbid obsession with legal sin"
that characterizes remedial approaches to affirmative action); Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of
Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HAgv. L. Rnv. 78, 92 (1986)
(noting the "potentially protracted litigation over the 'factual predicate'" for remedial
programs).
27 See, for example, Sheila Foster's argument for a concept of diversity that would seek
to include within various social institutions individuals who, on the basis of particular
differences, have been subjected to systematic exclusion and disadvantage in society. See
Foster, supra note 15, at 112.
2 8 See Sullivan, supra note 26, at 92 ("[Blecause corrective justice focuses on victims,
and retributive justice on wrongdoers, predicating affirmative action on past sins of
discrimination invites claims that neither nonvictims should benefit, nor nonsinners pay.").
Derrick Bell discusses the ease with which these assertions are made: "It is simply too
comforting for many white people to ignore the facts, to hearken to their fears, and say with
real belief that blacks are demanding privileges they have not earned to remedy injustices they
have not suffered." DEmucK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QuEsr FOR
RACxALJUSnCE 73 (1987).
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Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke were two supporting determinations: first,
that educational diversity was a compelling governmental interest because of its
close association with First Amendment values, and second, that consideration
of race as one factor in selecting the members of an academic community was a
permissible means of achieving the desired educational diversity. 29 The first
determination was flawed by failure to consider more carefully the nature of the
diversity to which academic communities aspire. This Article concludes that
academic devotion to the kind of intellectual exchange contemplated as a
preeminent First Amendment value is not, and has never been, as "robust" as
Justice Powell apparently assumed. Recognition of this fact would have yielded
a less confident appraisal of the relationship between educational diversity and
First Amendment values and would undermine the determination that
educational diversity is a compelling governmental interest. Justice Powell's
second determination lacked the close attention to means and alternatives that
characterize modem applications of strict scrutiny. Close scrutiny of the means
chosen to achieve educational diversity also suggests that the diversity to which
academic communities aspire is not the diversity that Justice Powell envisioned.
This Article concludes that neither the interests actually sought by academic
communities nor the race-conscious means selected to attain these interests
satisfy the rigorous scrutiny now required of all race-conscious programs. 30
In Part II, this Article reviews the signals in recent Supreme Court opinions
which suggest that Justice Powell's treatment of diversity as a compelling
29 For support of the status of diversity as a compelling interest, see, e.g., Laura C.
Scanlan, Note, Hopwood v. Texas: A Backward Look at Affirmative Action in Education, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1580 (1996).
3 0 Although the claimed benefits of educational diversity have been used to justify a
variety of race-conscious policies, including eligibility for particular scholarships or for
membership in particular student organizations, this Article will focus on admissions and
hiring policies. For a discussion of the scholarship issue, see Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-
Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 759 (1995);
Rachel Spector, Note, Minority Scholarships: A New Battle in the War on Affirmative Action,
77 IOWA L. REV. 307 (1991). For cases concerning the constitutionality of minority
scholarships, see Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1128 (1995); Flanagan v. President and Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377
(D.D.C. 1976) (striking down exclusive minority scholarships). Sometimes, subsidiary
programs of a university adopt race-conscious policies. For example, the law reviews at some
law schools make use of race-conscious decisionmaking in their membership decisions. See
Frederick Ramos, Note, Affirmative Action on Law Reviews: An Empirical Study of Its Status
and Effect, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 179 (1988) (concluding that affirmative action
programs are the most effective means of increasing minority membership on law reviews).
For further consideration of the lack of diversity on law reviews, see Mark A. Godsey,
Educational Inequalities, the Myth of Meritocracy, and the Silencing of Minority Voices: The
Need for Diversity on Anerica's Law Reviews, 12 HARv. BLACKLmTER J. 59 (1995).
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governmental interest sufficient to justify at least some forms of race-conscious
decisionmaking is not likely to survive much longer. In Part I, this Article
revisits Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and considers whether his discussion
of educational diversity as a compelling governmental interest is coherent.
Here, I consider the appropriateness of using race as a proxy for intellectual
diversity, especially in light of the failure to consider another important proxy:
religious belief. Finally, in Part IV, this Article examines whether the use of
race as a proxy for achieving educational diversity satisfies the narrow tailoring
requirement of strict scrutiny.
II. THE EMERGING FACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOCTRINE
Criticisms of the diversity rationale have generally occupied marginal
positions within the legal academy, both because of widespread consensus as to
the agreeableness of diversity programs and because of the apparent
constitutionality of these programs after Bakke.31 However, the long tenure of
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion may soon come to an end. The U.S. Supreme
Court's recent cases involving race-conscious decisionmaking have not
explicitly overruled Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. The Court, in fact, has
not considered a case involving racial preferences in higher education since
Bakke. Collectively, however, the opinions in the Court's recent affirmative
action cases clearly cast a pall over the continued use of Justice Powell's
31 The chorus of support for the diversity rationale has not been uniform. In particular,
some minority scholars have expressed reservations about the diversity rationale. Consider,
for example, the protest voiced by Richard Delgado, a critical race scholar, to the concept of
diversity:
In law school admissions, for example, majority persons may be admitted as a matter of
right, while minorities are admitted because their presence will contribute to
"diversity." . . . The assumption is that such diversity is educationally valuable to the
majority. But such an admissions program may well be perceived as treating the
minority admittee as an ornament, a curiosity, one who brings an element of the piquant
to the lives of white professors and students.
Delgado, supra note 15, at 570 n.46. Other minority scholars have expressed disapproval of
the diversity formulation because it institutionalizes a focus on race rather than on merit:
I simply do not want race-conscious decisionmaldng to be naturalized into our general
pattern of academic evaluation. I do not want race-conscious decisionmaking to lose its
status as a deviant mode ofjudging people or the work they produce. I do not want race-
conscious decisionmaling to be assimilated into our conception of meritocracy.
R. Kennedy, supra note 24, at 1807.
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diversity formulation as a justification for race-conscious decisions in
admissions and hiring in colleges and universities.32
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bakke signaled the beginning of a
decade-long search for a doctrinal framework within which to analyze race-
conscious programs intended to benefit minority groups.33 Justice Powell's
original view as to the appropriate scrutiny to be applied to benign racial
preferences has now prevailed, both with respect to state and local
classifications and to those made at the federal level. In City of Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 34 a majority of the Court held that all race-conscious
classifications made by state and local governments-even those which benefit
minority groups-were subject to strict scrutiny. Recently, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,35 a majority of the Court determined that federal
race-conscious decisions were also subject to this exacting scrutiny, overruling,
at least in part, the contrary reasoning of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 36
which subjected a federal policy designed to benefit racial minorities in the field
of broadcasting to intermediate scrutiny. 37 For race-conscious admissions or
32 See Amar & Katyal, supra note 17, at 1745 ("Bakke, it seems, now hangs by a
thread.") (footnote omitted); Foster, supra note 15, at 109 (suggesting that the diversity
justification for race-conscious decisionmaking will probably not survive in light of the
current composition of the U.S. Supreme Court); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based
Affimative Action, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1037, 1041 (1996) (opining that diversity justifications
for affirmative action are "particularly endangered" after Adarand); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 Thx.
L. Rav. 993, 998-99 (1993) (arguing that the Court's more recent affirmative action
precedents are inconsistent with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke). But see Levinson, supra
note 25, at 120-21 (relying on the idea of stare decisis developed in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), to suggest that Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy may not be inclined to overrule Bakke).
33 In this area of constitutional law, as in others, one's choice of classifications mirrors
one's position in the larger debate. Justices who have been willing to recognize a relatively
spacious constitutional harbor for racial preferences for minorities have frequently
characterized these preferences as "benign" racial classifications, as distinguished from
"invidious" racial classifications. See, e.g., casting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-65
(1990), overrnded by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Justices who
have envisioned a far more limited constitutional haven for such preferences refuse to label
them "benign." See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1993).
34 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989) (invalidating a municipal set-aside program for minority
business).
35 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a federal program designed to
benefit disadvantaged businesses and employing a racial classification).
36 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
37 For academic praise of the Metro Broadcasting decision, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
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hiring decisions to survive constitutional challenge, it is now clear that academic
institutions must further a compelling governmental interest and must do so
through narrowly tailored measures. 38
Although the standard of review is clear, it is less clear what interests will
be deemed sufficiently compelling and what means tailored sufficiently
narrowly to satisfy strict scrutiny. The Court's recent cases have articulated
only one government interest sufficiently compelling to justify race-conscious
classifications: the interest in remedying the effects of specifically identified
instances of racial discrimination. 39 For example, although Justice O'Connor,
writing for a majority of the Court in Adarand, emphasized that strict scrutiny
is not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact" 40 the only counterexample she offered
to rebut this received wisdom was the holding of the Court in United States v.
Paradise.41 There, a majority of the Court upheld a hiring quota imposed by
the district court to remedy discrimination against blacks in Alabama's
Department of Public Safety.42 Even the dissenters in the case-Justice
O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia-agreed that the federal
government had a compelling governmental interest in remedying past and
present discrimination by the Department. 43 Similarly, in Wygant v. Jackson
A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991); Allen S. Hammond, IV,
Diversity and Equal Protection in the Marketplace: The Metro Broadcasting Case in Context,
44 ARK. L. REV. 1063 (1991); Smolla, supra note 22, at 959-60; Patricia J. Williams, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARv. L. REv. 525 (1990).
The Metro Broadcasting decision was criticized in Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. RE. 107 (1990).
38 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 ("such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests."); Id. at 235 ("We
think that requiring strict scrutiny is the best way to ensure that courts will consistently give
racial classifications ... detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means."). For a
general discussion of the Court's treatment of compelling interests, see Stephen E. Gottlieb,
Compelling Government Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional
Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv. 917 (1988).
39 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that the only
recognized compelling governmental interest is the remedying of past racial discrimination).
But see Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919-21 (7th Cir. 1996) (arguing that there may be
many compelling interests). See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in
Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 359-61 (1997) (suggesting that conclusions as
to which governmental interests are compelling in the equal protection context have not been
rooted in the text, history, and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment).
40 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring)).
41 480 U.S. 149, 153 (1987).
42 See id. at 166-86.
43 See id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissenters departed from the majority
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Board of Education,44 a majority of the Court found that a layoff provision in a
collective bargaining agreement between a school board and a teachers' union
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it gave preferential protection
against layoffs to members of certain minority groups.45 A plurality opinion
rejected the argument that the preference was justified by the state's interest in
providing teacher role models for minority children. This argument, according
to the plurality, had "no... stopping point," and because the governmental
interest was not linked to any proper remedial purpose, it could be continued
indefinitely. 46 Language from the Court's opinion in Croson47 also suggests that
a majority of the Court will only recognize interests in remedying past
discrimination as sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny. 48 Justice
O'Connor, in a portion of her opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice White, and Justice Kennedy, noted that racial classifications risk
inflicting stigmatic harm, and observed that unless such classifications "are
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility." 49 Justice Scalia has
denied that even remedial interests are sufficiently compelling to justify race-
by concluding that the hiring quota was not narrowly tailored to achieve the government's
compelling interest and that strict scrutiny had therefore not been satisfied. See id. at 196-
201.
44 476 U.S. 267, 270-72 (1986).
45 See id. at 284.
46 Id. at 275 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor, J.). In a
separate opinion, Justice White agreed that the state's asserted interest in providing role
models for minority children was not sufficient to justify the racial preference. See id. at 295
(White, J., concurring).
47 488 U.S. 469, 477-83 (1989).
48 Charles Fried, commenting on the Court's decision in Croson, suggested in 1989 that
"[t]he principal, perhaps the only, state interest sufficiently compelling to [satisfy strict
scrutiny] is the remedying of identified acts of discrimination .... " Charles Fried,
Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.: A Response to the Scholars'
Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155, 161 (1989).
49 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor apparently revised her
views on this point. In Wiygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring), she seemed to
suggest agreement with Justice Powell's finding that diversity was a compelling state interest
and further hypothesized that the Court might yet acknowledge other interests sufficiently
compelling to justify affirmative action programs. See also id. at 288 n.* (distinguishing
between an interest in providing role models-which she deemed not sufficiently compelling
to satisfy strict scrutiny-and an interest in fostering diversity among faculty). On the
evolution of Justice O'Connor's views regarding diversity, see Kahlenberg, supra note 32, at
1041-42. See also Justin Schwartz, A Not Quite Color-Blind Constitution: Racial
Discrimination and Racial Preference in Justice O'Connor's "Newest" Equal Protection
Jurisprudence, 58 Omo ST. L.J., 1055 (1997).
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conscious classifications.5 0 On the present Court, only Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg have specifically endorsed a governmental interest in educational
diversity as sufficiently weighty to justify race-conscious policies.51 In contrast
with this position, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
have each recently written or joined opinions denying that diversity constituted
a compelling governmental interest. 52
50 For example, Justice Scalia has stated:
In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the
basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite
direction... . Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination
should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a
creditor or a debtor race.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). According to Justice
Scalia, the only interest sufficiently compelling to justify racial classifications of any sort
would involve "a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb-.
for example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates." See also
Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The benign purpose of compensating for
social disadvantages, whether they have been acquired by reason of prior discrimination or
otherwise, can no more be pursued by the illegitimate means of racial discrimination than can
other assertedly benign purposes we have repeatedly rejected.") (citations omitted); Id. at 521
(Scalia, J., concurring).
51 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 257 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, I have always
believed that... the FCC program we upheld in [Metro Broadcasting] would have satisfied
any of our various standards in affirmative-action cases-including the one the majority
fashions today."). See also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
a school board could determine that "an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to
the student body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty").
Richard D. Kahlenberg has pointed out that two other dissenters in Adarand, Justices Souter
and Breyer, did not use the occasion to express support for the diversity rationale for
affirmative action. See Kahlenberg, supra note 32, at 1042-43.
52 See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J.):
Modem equal protection has recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying
the effects of racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast
viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too
insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial
classifications.
One might argue that the dissenters in Metro Broadcasting opposed the use of race as a proxy
for promoting broadcast diversity but did not necessarily oppose the use of race to promote
educational diversity. Justice O'Connor reasoned in a fashion, however, that seemed to call
into question any use of race as a proxy for viewpoint: "The Constitution provides that the
Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court had previously upheld a racial
preference designed to benefit certain minorities in Metro Broadcasting53 as
substantially related to the government's important interest in broadcast
diversity, a majority of the Court in Adarand overruled a key aspect of the
holding in Metro Broadcasting.54 In Metro Broadcasting, a majority of the
Court upheld two FCC policies that granted preferential treatment to certain
minorities. 55 Crucial to this holding was the majority's determination that
congressionally mandated racial preferences intended to compensate victims of
past discrimination were permissible so long as they served "important
governmental objections within the power of Congress and [were] substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." 56 The Court accordingly
determined that the promotion of broadcast diversity was, "at the very least,"
an important governmental interest. 57 Now that Adarand has made this
determination irrelevant, by insisting on a higher level of scrutiny for race-
assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or think." Id. at 602. Recently,
Justice Thomas, who joined the Court after Metro Broadcasting, has also argued that
diversity is not a compelling governmental interest. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part). Although in Wygant Justice O'Connor referred to the fact that a "state
interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least
in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that
interest," 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part), it is now clear that this passage
should be understood as Justice O'Connor's description of existing understandings of
affirmative action doctrine rather than as her own judgment concerning the appropriateness of
these understandings.
53 Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 600.
54 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
55 The FCC construed minorities to include "those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed,
American Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction." Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 555 n.1 (quoting Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of
Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 980 n.8 (1978)). The first policy at issue was one
according to which the FCC determined that minority ownership and participation in the
management of a broadcast facility would be considered as a "plus" in comparative
proceedings for a new broadcast license. Id. at 557. The second policy consisted of a minority
"distress sale" policy, which facilitated the transfer of existing broadcast stations to minority-
owned companies. Id. at 552, 557-58.
56 Id. at 565.
57 Id. at 567. The Court's decision in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2276-
77 (1996), appears to contemplate the possibility that educational diversity might justify the
kind of gender discrimination necessary to support the existence of single-sex schools in some
circumstances but denies that diversity was the real aim of the program in that case. Again,
though, this countenancing of diversity occurred under the auspices of intermediate level
scrutiny. See id. at 2275-76.
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conscious programs,58 there is little reason to believe that the Metro
Broadcasting decision will offer a safe harbor to the diversity rationale in the
increasingly rough weather that race-conscious programs seem to face.
There are, of course, substantial objections one might make to the Court's
use of strict scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of race-conscious decisions
benefiting minorities. In view of the typically fatal effect such review has on
racial classifications, the affirmative action debate has focused much attention
on this doctrinal issue. This Article is not intended to review the Court's
determination on this point. Instead, it re-evaluates Justice Powell's conclusion
in Bakke that the consideration of race as a "plus" factor in university
admissions can survive strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis.
III. THE BAKKE OPINION
The general contours of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke are familiar and
need not be greatly elaborated upon.59 Justice Powel determined that race-
conscious admissions decisions at a public institution must satisfy strict
scrutiny-that is, be precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest.60 He then rejected as sufficiently compelling several interests allegedly
served by the race-conscious admissions program in effect at the medical school
of the University of California at Davis. Justice Powell dismissed out-of-hand
the contention that the state had any legitimate interest in simply assuring that
the medical school's student body had specified percentages of particular racial
or ethnic groups. 61 He also denied that the state institution had a compelling
interest in assisting certain groups believed to be the object of "social
discrimination." 62 Furthermore, he rejected the state's asserted interest in
delivering health-care services to under-served communities as adequate
justification for its admissions policies, arguing that the state had not
demonstrated how preferential admissions policies for minority groups actually
furthered its asserted interest.63
Justice Powell, though, agreed with the state that it had an interest in
58 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (requiring strict scrutiny for racial classifications).
59 For the historical background of the Bakke opinion, see BERNARD SCHWAR'IZ,
BERND BAm AFF M TIvE ACrioN AND TiE SuPREmE COURT (1988). See also Mark V.
Tushnet, The Suqreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-1991: The View from the
Marshall Papers, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 512-31 (1995) (discussing Justice Powell's
affirmative action analysis in Bakke).
60 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299.
61 See id. at 307.
62 1d. at 310.
63 See id.
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securing a diverse student body. This, he said, "clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher [learning]." 64 Of course, with the
Justice's invocation of strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review,
merely "permissible" or "legitimate" goals became insufficient to sustain the
state's race-conscious program. In fact, Justice Powell ultimately denominated
the interest in diversity as a compelling one,65 but his intellectual route to this
determination was not altogether clear.
Justice Powell observed that the interest in selecting a diverse array of
students implicated the principle of academic freedom, noting that this freedom,
though not specifically enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, was nevertheless a
"special concern" of the First Amendment. 66 Academic freedom, as Justice
Frankfurter observed in his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,67
includes among its constitutive elements the freedom of an academic institution
to choose its students.6s Freedom to choose students numbered among the "four
essential freedoms" of a university, which included: "[Freedom] to determine
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 69 But this freedom to
choose students did not in-and-of-itself constitute the requisite compelling
interest sufficient to justify the state's preferential admissions program in Bakke.
Justice Powell would ultimately deny that the University of California could
shield its use of racial quotas in admissions under the mantle of academic
freedom. This was because the academic freedom that Justice Powell
recognized as having compelling weight was an instrumental freedom rather
than a right of autonomous decisionmaking, an instrumental freedom in service
of a more fundamental First Amendment interest: the interest in promoting a
"robust exchange of ideas." 70
In harnessing academic freedom to this instrumental end, Justice Powell
was on solid precedential footing. The Court had previously emphasized the
relationship between academic freedom and the marketplace of ideas in
64 Id. at 311-12.65 See id. at 314-15 ("As the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a
university's admissions program, the question remains whether the program's racial
classification is necessary to promote this interest.").
66 Id. at 312.
67 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
68 Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
69 Id. (quoting conference of REPRENu ATmV OF TE UNivERsiy OF CAPE TOWN AND
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WrrWATERSRAND, "tm OPEN UNIVERSmIFs IN SOUTH AFRICA 10
(1957) thereinafter CONFERENCE]).
70 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
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Keyishian v. Board of Regents:71
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment.... The
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection." 72
Justice Frankfirter had also celebrated the "four essential freedoms" of the
academy within the context of the more fundamental value of free speech. The
four freedoms flourished in the atmosphere where creation was the central
business of the university: "the atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation." 73 Thus, Justice Powell recognized as a
compelling interest not simply a university's abstract interest in selecting
students, but the more focused interest in selecting "those students who will
contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas."' 74 He recognized that
students with particular backgrounds "may bring to a professional school of
medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student
71 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (upholding the rights of faculty members to refuse to certify
to the administrators of the university that they were not communists).
72 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). In the previous decade the Court acknowledged the benefits of a
racially diverse student body in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). There, the Court
denied that a black student consigned to a recently established black law school would receive
the educational equivalent of a law degree from the University of Texas Law School. See id.
at 635-36. The Court stated that few students and no one who has practiced law would
choose to study in an academic vacuum, which is removed from the interplay of ideas and the
exchange of views with which the law is concerned:
The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its student
body members of the racial groups which number 85 % of the population of the State and
include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom
petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With
such a substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that
the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if
admitted to the University of Texas Law School.
Id. at 634.
73 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
74 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313. As Rodney Smolla observed, "classic First Amendment
theory always pledged allegiance to the value of diversity, [but] this diversity was to arise
spontaneously, of its own devices, from an unregulated market." Smolla, supra note 22, at
958-59.
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body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital
service to humanity." 75 But Justice Powell ultimately denied that racial or ethnic
backgrounds could be given automatically determinative effect in securing the
intended "robust" assortment of students. "The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element. Petitioner's special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic
diversity, would hinder rather than further the attainment of genuine
diversity." 76 Consequently, Justice Powell concluded that racial or ethnic
background might appropriately be considered as one factor in an admissions
process, but that it could not be made determinative of outcomes within that
process. 77
A. Viewpoints, Perspectives, and Proxies
There is a curious omission in Justice Powell's vision of diversity. Justice
Powell rooted the compelling weight assigned to educational diversity in the
First Amendment value of a robust exchange of ideas. Yet, when Justice Powell
enumerated the personal characteristics that might "promote beneficial
educational pluralism," 78 his list was altogether devoid of any explicit reference
to intellectual viewpoints. Characteristics relevant to educational pluralism
might include, according to the Justice, "exceptional personal talents, unique
work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated
compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with
the poor, or other qualifications deemed important." 79 If intellectual pluralism
is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify a racial classification, then the
characteristics that Justice Powell cites as possibly relevant to the achievement
of this pluralism seem at best weak proxies for more immediately relevant
characteristics, such as the viewpoints held by students on matters likely to be
addressed in the academic environment. 80
To accept this viewpoint, one need not hold that reliance on race as a proxy
for viewpoints or perspectives is irrational.81 Assertions that consideration of
75 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
76Id. at 315.
77 See id. at 317-18.
78 Id. at 317.
79 Id.
80 See Brest & Oshige, supra note 15, at 863 ("Ultimately, what matters to an
institution's intellectual mission is not group membership or background as such, but a
multiplicity of intellectual perspectives.").
81 On the relevance of race to viewpoint and perspective, see, e.g., EDLEY, supra note
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race as one factor in attempting to foster intellectual diversity is irrational
amount to nothing more than loose talk.82 For example, the Fifth Circuit in
Hopwood v. Texas suggested that consideration of race as a factor in selecting a
diverse student body is "no more rational on its terms than would be choices
based upon the physical size or blood type of applicants." 83 But having type A
blood in the United States does not carry the same cultural freight as, for
example, being black does. In this country, race has been made relevant-
wrongly so-in a myriad of ways that blood type has not. To ignore these
patterns of meanings is simply to ignore social reality.84
Suppose, through some bizarre and irrational set of circumstances, that
blood type was made a basis for social hierarchy and for the distribution of
social advantages and disadvantages in a society. For generations, individuals
with a particular blood type-type 0, let us suppose-were subordinated by the
force of law and social practice, until finally, the society realized its previous
4, at 136-37; Aleinikoff, supra note 37, at 1092-95 (describing as "implausible" the idea that
the meaning of race is the same for members of different races); Anita L. Allen, On Being a
Role Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 22 (1991); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian
American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space,
81 CAL. L. Rnv. 1243, 1247-50 (1993) (arguing that discrimination suffered by Asian
Americans is different than that suffered by other groups, and that this has "certain
implications for the study of Asian-Americans and the law"); Delgado, supra note 15, at 567
(pointing out reasons why scholarship dealing with the rights of a group should include the
scholarship by members of that group); Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity as a
Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1366-67 (1996)
(describing the influence of race on experience). But see CARTER, supra note 20, at 32-36
(1991) (expressing criticism of the essentialist view of race); R. Kennedy, supra note 24, at
1802-03 (challenging the use of race as an intellectual credential).
82 See Delgado, supra note 23. In particular, Delgado asserts that:
A moment's reflection enables us to take notice that most law-and-economics scholars
are conservative Republicans; that most radical feminists are women, not men; and that
most Critical Race Theory exponents are men and women of color. Law schools are not
required to ignore what everyone knows, namely that color, gender, and life experience
sometimes matter.
Id. at 1016.
83 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996).
84 For the suggestion that racial discrimination may be rational in some contexts, see
David Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 108-10 (giving
examples of efficient discrimination); Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL.
L. REv. 751, 755-56 (1991) (describing possible scenarios in which discrimination might be
viewed as economically rational); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
314 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[1]n our present society, race is not always irrelevant to
sound governmental decisionmaking.").
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wrong and determined that blood type could no longer be used as a basis for
classifying citizens. Now, perhaps that society might determine that the risk of
improper use of the blood type classification warranted a bar on any use of
blood type, even rational uses. There might be grounds for this determination.
But to say this is not also to say that the society could, by this decision,
immediately change the social meanings that had been attached to blood type
and the varying perspectives that would have arisen out of these meanings.
It probably would not be rational to assume that individuals with the
formerly disfavored blood type could be expected to hold certain views in
common (other than the conviction that the blood type disfavoring was wrong).
Some type O's would hold generally liberal viewpoints, some would hold
conservative ones. Many type O's might favor official actions to affirmatively
undo certain social constructions and patterns made on the basis of the now
discredited classification, even if doing so required taking blood type into
account so as to benefit type O's. Others, though fewer perhaps, might hold
that only blood type-blindness would carry the country beyond its previous
wrongful use of blood type as a classifying device. Whether liberal or
conservative, though, type O's reached their respective political orientations
through the experience of being type O's in a society in which blood type
mattered in the past and still matters in numerous ways, despite official efforts
to repudiate the past discrimination. Suppose academic institutions still wrestle
with questions based on blood type classifications, for example, whether the
classification should be permitted under any circumstances, whether its victims
should be compensated in some respect, and the nature of social contributions
that cultures which grew up around membership in the formerly disfavored
class of type O's have produced. 85 Is it irrational to believe that discussions on
these issues might be benefited by the presence of some type O's, not because
any particular type 0 can be expected to advocate a specific viewpoint, but
because type O's and the social predicaments that have arisen out of their
85 See Williams, supra note 37, at 529:
For example, the literal biological truth that blacks (or members of any other racial
or ethnic groups) are not born with genetic inclination for "things black" is often used to
obscure the fact that "black" (like most racial or ethnic classification) also defines a
culture. Blackness as culture (perhaps more easily understood as such in the designation
"African-American") usually evokes a shared heritage of language patterns, habits,
history, and experience.
Id. See also Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and
Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263, 336 (1995) (suggesting that race actually
represents culture in the context of diversity policies).
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treatment are the very subject of important academic discussions?86
Furthermore, might it not be reasonable to take deliberate steps to see that type
O's would be represented in academic settings precisely as a way of rebutting
crude essentialisms which posit that all type O's think or behave in certain
ways?87 Therefore, even if it may not be prudent to take into account whether a
particular applicant for admission to an academic institution is a type 0, even if
it is for some reason an immoral consideration, it can hardly be said to be
irrational. To discussions about type O's and society's treatment of them, type
O's bring a unique perspective, whether they are conservative or liberal-the
perspective of being a type 0 in a society where blood type has mattered and
continues to matter. 88
86 Professor Sanford Levinson heralds the benefits of a diverse classroom and criticizes
the Fifth Circuit for failing to recognize that importance in Hopwood:
Mhe fact that legal education in my own experience is far better if the classrooms are
made up of diverse rather than racially or ethnically (or, for that matter, regionally)
homogeneous student bodies. As someone who regularly teaches courses involving the
great issues of American society, I can testify to the importance of such diverse classes
in generating acute, even if at times uncomfortable, discussions. The interpretive
confidence of the Fifth Circuit panel is matched only by its consummate ignorance of the
way that law schools actually work.
Levinson, supra note 25, at 116.
87 On the dangers of racial essentialism, see RuTH COLKER, HYBRim: BmsExuALs,
MuTLmACLAmS, AND OTHERMmSFrrs UNDERAMERCAN LAW 138 (1996); Paulsen, supra note
32, at 1000 ("People are not intellectual captives of their skin color."). Even if race were not
a reasonable proxy for the viewpoints and perspectives of students, race-consciousness in
important public institutions-such as educational institutions-may yet be rational in a society
still gripped by this kind of consciousness:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a school board may
reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the
student body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty. For
one of the most important lessons that the American public schools teach is that the
diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have been brought together in our
famous "melting pot" do not identify essential differences among the human beings that
inhabit our land. It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher that
color, like beauty, is only "skin deep"; it is far more convincing to experience that truth
on a day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing learning process.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens finds a use for race-consciousness in a policy designed to subvert race-consciousness.
By explicitly seeking to include racial minorities, government-according to Justice Stevens-
seeks to display openly the irrelevance of race in a democratic society. See id. at 320.
88 Discussing the importance of race to social and personal identity, Wasserstrom
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My argument, then, is not that using race as a proxy for viewpoint and
perspective is unreasonable, but that the failure to investigate viewpoints and
perspectives themselves in some more direct fashion is curious if academic
institutions in fact seek to establish a diverse exchange of ideas. This curiosity
would almost certainly not be sufficient grounds for invalidating race-conscious
programs under the lowest tier of equal protection scrutiny. But it does pose
problems for race-conscious programs subjected-as they now must be-to
strict scrutiny. 89
Why would academic institutions interested in creating a diverse exchange
of ideas emphasize their commitment to considering a variety of proxies, such
as race and socioeconomic background, rather than the actual viewpoints and
ideas held by would-be members of these institutions? Conceivably, one might
respond that various administrative difficulties would attend an attempt to select
students and faculty, even partially, on the basis of the viewpoints they actually
held. Suppose, for example, potential students or faculty were asked to fill out
questionnaires or to write essays designed to elicit their perspectives on a
variety of issues. 90 How would academic institutions prevent misrepresentations
in these situations? Of course, the problem of misrepresentation can arise even
if universities rely on other proxies for viewpoints instead of trying to ascertain
concluded that:
One complex but true empirical fact about our society is that the race of an individual is
much more than a fact of superficial physiology. It is, instead, one of the dominant
characteristics that affects both the way the individual looks at the world and the way the
world looks at the individual.
Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 586 (1977). Of course, there may be academic settings in
which the subject of blood type does not arise often. For at least some type O's, this kind of
setting would be extraordinarily rare, because, they would argue, the meanings once ascribed
to blood type have influenced virtually every field of thought. But if there were settings in
which this argument was not plausible, then using blood type as a proxy for educational
diversity might be irrational.
89 Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627-28 (1984) (finding
impermissible the judicial assumption that women and minorities have "a different attitude
about such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations"
even if such generalizations have "a statistical basis in fact with respect to particular
positions").
90 The use of personal data in a narrative form to assist administrative or hiring decisions
is, of course, nothing unusual. For a proposal that greater reliance be made upon personal
statements than upon the mere fact of racial self-identification to determine the appropriate
beneficiaries of affirmative action programs, see Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural
Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REv. 957, 978-81
(1995) (describing a hypothetical admissions plan).
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viewpoints more directly.91 Some of these proxies are, perhaps, readily
verifiable and the fact that they are readily verifiable discourages
misrepresentations. But other proxies sometimes used in admissions-social
disadvantage, for example-may not be so readily verified, and thus may also
be subject to the risk of misrepresentation. Furthermore, even if a direct inquiry
into the viewpoints of students and faculty might entail some administrative
difficulties, one would expect that an application of strict scrutiny to the use of
race as a proxy would require some concrete showing of these difficulties; and
that the interest in avoiding administrative difficulties would fail, in any event,
to satisfy heightened scrutiny. 92
Finally, whatever difficulties might attend a direct inquiry into the
viewpoints and perspectives held by student applicants to a university, it is
much harder to imagine the same kind of difficulties in the case of faculty
hiring. If academic communities in fact desire to marshal an assortment of
viewpoints to provoke a "robust exchange of ideas," it is hard to see why they
need proxies such as race to do so. Scholars generally leave plenty of viewpoint
tracks in their wake: the contents of dissertations and publications, for example.
If an academic institution has need of a particular perspective to enrich its
debate, what prevents the institution from simply identifying candidates through
publications or presentations known to have the particular perspective sought?93
The use of race or even gender as a proxy for a particular sought-after
perspective, while not unreasonable per se, is nevertheless a crude selection
device, calculated to satisfy neither the asserted needs of an institution nor of a
scholar.94
91 For a discussion of possible misrepresentations concerning the proxy of race, see
Karst, supra note 85, at 337 (suggesting that false self-identifications of race are not a major
problem and need not require institutions to make an independent investigation of an
application's race in every case).
92 See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989) ("Mhe interest in
avoiding... bureaucratic effort cannot justify a rigid line drawn on the basis of a suspect
classification."); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (holding that statutes
drawing lines between the sexes solely for administrative convenience violate the Due Process
Clause). See generally Leslie W. Abramson, Equal Protection and Administrative
Convenience, 52 TENN. L. REv. 1, 13 (1984) (asserting that administrative convenience is not
a compelling governmental interest under strict scrutiny).
93 See Paulsen, supra note 32, at 1002 ("One can test directly for diversity of opinion by
asking someone about his or her views or thoughts on a particular issue.").
94 For a discussion of the disadvantage to some women and minorities of being included
in academic settings for reasons of diversity, see Donna E. Young, Two Steps Removed: The
Paradox of Diversity Discourse for Women of Color in Law Teaching, 11 Bmum y
WoMEN's L.J. 270 (1995):
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B. Academic Freedom and the Marketplace of Ideas
It is reasonable, at this point, to wonder whether universities in fact seek to
organize themselves as Holmesian marketplaces of ideas. The answer is that
universities do not, at least not in a sense familiar to traditional free speech
analysis. The academic freedom recognized by Justice Powell in Bakke was not
really a freedom in which the university was vitally interested. Justice Powell's
academic freedom was an instrumental one, which permitted a university to
pursue a certain kind of institutional life. The academic freedom sought by the
university, though, was in the nature of a right of autonomy that would have
permitted it to pursue its own, different, kind of institutional life. Here lies the
tension: the form of institutional life envisioned by Justice Powell was not the
life envisioned by the academic institution.
These variant understandings of academic freedom did not make their first
appearance in Bakke. These understandings reflected, rather, an already
established tension between an older but still resonant academic vision and a
judicial vision influenced by the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. 95 The academic vision-most importantly memorialized in the
American Association of University Professors' (AAUP) 1915 Declaration96-
is at odds with the pluralistic vision that has most influenced the Court's First
Amendment cases. The 1915 Declaration's vision of academic freedom is
rooted in the concept of scientific autonomy rather than intellectual pluralism.97
However, what is troubling is the tendency of diversity advocates to concentrate on
institutional or professional interests from the perspective of the majority, such as
providing a resource for majority faculty to learn about race and gender issues. These
interests often conflict with the professional interests of women and people of color who
enter the academy as the actual or perceived beneficiaries of affirmative action. The
institutional interest in having a resource for the majority faculty conflicts with a woman
of color law professor's interest in being seen as a competent professional in her areas of
expertise, not only in the areas of race and gender. Such conflicts may contribute to the
relatively high rate at which people of color and women leave legal academia.
Id. at 274 (footnote omitted).
95 See generally RIcH1AR HOS'TADTER & WALTER P. MMrZGER, THE DEVE LOPMENT
OF ACADEfV c FREEDOM IN THE UNrrED STATES (1955) (describing the history, emergence,
and transformations of academic freedom).
96 American Association of University Professors, General Report of the Committee on
Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 1 AAUP BuLL. 17 (1915), reprinted in 53 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1990, at 393.
97 The AAUP report describes "progress in scientific knowledge" as "essential to
civilization." Id. at 396.
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The 1915 Declaration champions the freedom of specialists, pursuing scientific
methodologies, to be free from lay interference. 98 Implicit in this view of
academic freedom was a categorization of ideas into those derived through
application of scientific methods of investigation and those that were the product
of mere popular prejudice. 99 The university contemplated by the 1915
Declaration was anything but a true "marketplace of ideas," because established
canons of scientific inquiry were expected to liberate academics in the search
for truth from baser ideas tinged with prejudice. 10 If the university could be
envisioned as a marketplace at all, it was one in which the regulators made sure
that inferior ideas were excluded out-of-hand.
Early references to the concept of academic freedom by Justices of the
Supreme Court tended to emphasize the values of academic autonomy and the
value of an unfettered academic inquiry in a spirit comfortable with the 1915
Declaration. 10 1 A dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas, frequently noted as
containing the first reference to "academic freedom" by a Justice of the
Supreme Court, links academic freedom to free inquiry. Adler v. Board of
Mhe proper fulfillment of the work of the professorate requires that our universities
shall be so free that no fair-minded person shall find any excuse for even a suspicion that
the utterances of university teachers are shaped or restricted by the judgment, not of
professional scholars, but of inexpert and possibly not wholly disinterested persons
outside of their ranks.
Id.; see also id. at 396-97 (stating that the teaching profession is corrupted when influenced
by any motive other than the "scientific conscience" of the professorate); id. at 401 ("The
claim to freedom of teaching is made in the interest of the integrity and of the progress of
scientific inquiry; it, is, therefore, only those who carry on their work in the temper of the
scientific inquirer who may justly assert this claim.").
98 See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 273-79 (1989) (describing the culture surrounding the
drafting of the AAUP's 1915 Declaration).
99 See id. at 273 (describing this view of scholarship as "a form of elite speech that
demanded protection from popular prejudices"); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom and
Political Neutrality in Law Schools: An Essay on Stncture and Ideology in Professional
Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 317-18 (1993).
10 Justice Holmes first articulated the marketplace metaphor in his dissent in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), observing that "the best test of trth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Id. at 630 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). For a general discussion and critique of the metaphor, see Stanley Igher, The
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
101 For a general overview of the development of a constitutional principle of academic
freedom, see William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the
Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBs., Summer 1990, at 79.
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Education02 involved a challenge to a New York law which disqualified
individuals from holding public positions of employment who were found to
have associated with any groups espousing the violent overthrow of the United
States government. A majority of the Court rejected the challenge on the now-
discredited grounds that public employment was a privilege-rather than a
right-to which government might attach such conditions as it deemed
appropriate.1 03 Justice Douglas dissented from this holding and rejected the
right/privilege distinction and argued that the law in question-as applied to
public teachers-limited academic freedom:
What happens under this law is typical of what happens in a police state.
Teachers are under constant surveillance; their pasts are combed for signs of
disloyalty; their utterances are watched for clues to dangerous thoughts. A pall
is cast over the classrooms. There can be no real academic freedom in that
environment. Where suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for fear of
their jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect. Supineness and
dogmatism take the place of inquiry.04
This early conception of academic freedom resonates with a concern for
autonomy consistent with the AAUP's 1915 Declaration. Similarly, in two
concurring opinions important to academic freedom authored by Justice
Frankfurter in the 1950s, the Justice defended academic freedom in terms of its
securing a right of autonomous inquiry by academics. For example, in Wieman
v. Updegraff,o5 Justice Frankfurter concurred in the Court's decision holding
unconstitutional a statute requiring a disclaimer oath as a condition of public
service, as applied to college professors, and observed that such a statute "has
an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers
ought especially to cultivate and practice."' 0 6 Frankfurter forged the same
alliance between academic freedom and intellectual autonomy in his concurring
opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,'0 7 where he described a university as
characterized "by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of
Socrates-'to follow the argument where it leads.' "108
Ultimately, however, a new rhetoric appeared in the Court's occasional
102 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
103 See id. at 492.
104 Id. at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
106 Id. at 195 (Frankfter, j., concurring).
107 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
108 Id. at 262 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting CONFERENCE, supra note 69,
at 10).
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references to academic freedom-a rhetoric focused not on autonomy but on
pluralism. Metaphors of debate and multiplicity of perspectives eventually
supplanted "free spirit" justifications for academic freedom. This new rhetoric
surfaced first in Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents,'0 9 where the image of the scientist, unmolested in the creative
isolation of the laboratory, was supplanted by the noisier and more peopled
image of the marketplace:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools." The classroom is peculiarly the
"marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection."110
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, relying heavily on the rhetoric of
Keyishian, returned to the same image of academic freedom: an image of
debate fostered by the existence of intellectual pluralism. The Nation's future,
he reiterated in Keyishian, "'depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples." 11 Thus, he argued, the State of California, in urging that its
universities be accorded "the right to select those students who will contribute
the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,' 112 had invoked "a countervailing
constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment." 113
One familiar with the idea of academic freedom enshrined in the 1915
Declaration reads this portion of Justice Powell's opinion with great
puzzlement. Had universities so altered their identities from 1915 to 1978 that
the image of the marketplace now supplanted the image of the secluded
research laboratory as defining the essence of the academic enterprise? If not,
then Justice Powell was asserting constitutional stature for a right that the
university had little interest in exercising, and had merely confused the
109 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
110 Id. at 603 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960), and United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)) (citations omitted).
111 University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (quoting Keyishian,
385 U.S. at 603).
112 Id.
113 Id.
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underlying issue of whether the state had a compelling interest in the race-
conscious program at issue. If the state's real interest was not in assembling a
robust debate, then the appeal to the First Amendment as a way of measuring
the weightiness of that interest was inappropriate.
In fact, the academics who penned the 1915 Declaration would probably
have been appalled at the notion of admitting students partially on the basis of
their race, or of any of a host of other personal characteristics unrelated to their
likely suitability as acolytes in the temple of scientific inquiry. Viewpoints
shaped by the personal experience of race would appear to constitute one of the
kinds of popular prejudice from which the AAUP sought to secure the modem
university. "Diversity," in fact, was anything but the aim of the 1915
Declaration. This Declaration championed the autonomy of scientific merit
rather than the rich multiplicity of human viewpoint and experience. It viewed
most of these viewpoints as threats to the scientific culture of the academy.
Thus, that universities in the 1970s were anxious to welcome viewpoints that
they would earlier have shunned undoubtedly reflects some change in
institutional self-definition. Had universities, though, embraced the idea of the
marketplace of ideas as the fitting metaphor for their academic enterprises or
was their devotion to racial and ethnic diversity geared to serve other purposes?
Conservative observers especially would deny that universities are true
marketplaces of ideas and would insist that universities have been captured
instead by political ideologies of the left, which routinely censor views of which
they disapprove." 4 But one need not assent to this controversial
characterization to recognize that academic institutions do not in fact aspire to
be the kind of free forum of ideas traditionally championed in First Amendment
cases. The university of the late twentieth century is more inclined to see
positive value in the rich particularity of experiences and perspectives from a
diverse community of students and faculty than the university of the early
twentieth century. Nevertheless, it still seeks to channel these experiences and
perspectives into a particular community of discourse that values some ideas
and forms of argument more than others. 115 In the name of the search for truth,
114 See, e.g., DnqSH D'SouzA, ILLiBERAL EDUCATION: THE PoImcs OF RACE AND
SEX ON CAMPUS (1991).
115 Speaking of academic hiring, Professor Levinson suggests that particular disciplines
within an academic community "will decide whose conversations it finds interesting, helpful,
or illuminating. Those people will be hired, and none others." SANFORD LEvINSON,
CONSirUTIONAL FArm 178 (1988). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278-79
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring):
In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a university
routinely make countless decisions based on the content of communicative materials.
They select books for inclusion in the library, they hire professors on the basis of their
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universities unabashedly attempt to suppress certain forms of discourse and to
nurture others. It is in the very nature of the academic enterprise to distinguish
between ideas worthy of investigation and discussion and those ideas deemed
beyond the pale, forms of discourse appropriate to the life of the mind and
forms relegated to the intellectually barren wilderness of talk radio. Universities
seek to celebrate the scholar and to silence the fool. They encourage critical
rather than reflexive thinking and the elaboration of careful arguments rather
than the mere assertion of fixed opinion. Universities may endow chairs for the
astronomy, but not for the study of UFOs shortly expected to deliver a chosen
few of Earth's inhabitants to a higher plane of existence.
Law schools, for example, typically share a set of common ideological
commitments. J. Peter Byrne describes these ideologies as shared beliefs that
"the legal profession and the institutions it dominates ought to serve 'the public
interest,' that existing laws should be improved, and that individual lawyers
ought to be competent and ethical." 116 A legal scholar who opposed these ideas,
Byrne suggests, that a lawyer who
did in fact argue that the only valid purpose of the legal system was to make
lawyers rich, that questioning the perfection of existing laws was blasphemous,
or that lawyers should bribe officials whenever it serves their clients'
interest ... would be treated like a biologist who asserted that moonbeams
give birth to living organisms. 117
To make this observation is only to note that the life of law schools, and of
universities generally, can hardly be reduced to the uncomplicated role of First
Amendment midwife. Academic institutions serve manifold aims, and these
aims frequently call upon such institutions to regulate and to restrict the free
flow of ideas celebrated by the marketplace metaphor.
The failure of universities to pay close attention to the actual viewpoints of
would-be students, then, is not a mere capitulation to administrative
convenience. It is true, as a general matter, that the universities value some
diversity of opinion, experience, background, and perspective among their
students. Universities view a diversity of these characteristics as important in
enlivening the highly structured and regulated community of speech to which
they aspire. In some ways, the universities value this kind of multiplicity of
academic philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the curriculum, and they
reward scholars for what they have written.
Id. at 278.
116 Byrne, supra note 99, at 330.
117 Id.
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experience and background not so much for the diverse viewpoints to which
they contribute, but because these experiences and backgrounds themselves
become data in the academic discourse. Universities, though, are not really
interested in replicating the full range of ideas of viewpoints available within the
broader society in which the universities find themselves. There is nothing
nefarious in this lack of enthusiasm for every conceivable viewpoint and
perspective. In fact, it is difficult to imagine an academic institution that did not
practice the form of intellectual discrimination that most universities do in fact
practice." 8 Strangely, however, it is not easy to place the intellectual selectivity
of universities on the mantle of the First Amendment. 119
What the University of California sought in Bakke had more in common
with the older view of academic freedom-a view emphasizing autonomy-than
with the Supreme Court's more recent view of academic freedom-
emphasizing robust debate. The University attempted to gain the right for
experts to determine autonomously the kind of educational environment to
which it aspired. On this point, however, the University suffered clear defeat. It
could not cloak race consciousness beneath an incantation of the values of
autonomy and of the deference owed to educational expertise. Instead, Justice
Powell granted the University freedom only to create an environment
characterized by a robust exchange of ideas. But, as I have suggested, this was
not a freedom that universities were or are now inclined to assert rigorously. To
do so would be to change the intellectual environment that universities were
endeavoring to sustain. Therefore, the appropriate inquiry was not whether
118 Robert Post characterizes the university's mission as that of providing "critical
education," which he elaborates as requiring "not only an unfettered freedom of ideas, but
also honesty, fidelity to reason, and respect for method and procedures." Robert C. Post,
Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267, 324
(1991).
119 Some of the content discrimination of speech in which public universities engage
may be classed as a structuring of government's own speech rather than as a regulation of
private speech. In these situations universities have more latitude under the First Amendment
to govern speech in ways that further their legitimate missions.
[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. When the
University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University
speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is
not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own
message.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823 (1995). On the
special First Amendment issues raised by government speech, see generally MARK G.
YUDOF, WHEN GOvERNMENT SPEAKS: PoLTcs, LAW, AND GOvERNMENT EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA (1983).
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universities have a compelling interest in assembling a diverse array of students
and faculty to produce a robust exchange of ideas. The appropriate inquiry was,
rather, whether universities have a compelling interest in enhancing the
diversity of the participants in an academic discourse that deliberately seeks to
suppress particular ideas and forms of argument and to foster other ideas and
arguments. This, I suggest, is a more difficult question than the one that Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke purported to resolve.
C. Managing the Marketplace of Ideas
Implicit in Justice Powell's understanding of educational diversity was the
recognition that government may manage the marketplace of ideas as exhibited
in a university setting. At least two kinds of management are plausible in this
setting. First, a university might seek to manage the ideas expressed in its
academic community in ways calculated to maximize the variety of intellectual
wares exhibited there. Second, a university might seek-in fact, as I argued in
the last section, does seek-to manage ideas in a way that sustains the particular
kind of discourse that it seeks to create. The first kind of management seeks to
maximize the variety of speech; the second seeks to maximize the quality of
speech. These two kinds of management are in obvious tension with one
another. An actual attempt to maximize all possible viewpoints within the
university would jeopardize its program of championing particular kinds of
viewpoints. But, the university does, in fact, try to have it both ways: it seeks a
diversity of perspective and experience among its students and faculty, while at
the same time it seeks to champion the intellectual norms of its various
disciplines.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never precisely addressed either kind of
management in the academic context. Guided by the marketplace metaphor, the
Court has tended to assume that First Amendment values are best served by
preventing government-sponsored suppression of particular voices, and thus
assuring the ability of differing voices to be heard by. Both forms of
marketplace management that I have described, however, constitute content
discrimination of speech and, in some cases, viewpoint discrimination. These
kinds of discrimination are traditionally disfavored in First Amendment law.12 0
The U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely blessed diversity management
120 Generly, public institutions may not base employment decisions on political
affiliations or viewpoints of candidates. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 71
(1990) (stating that conditioning employment on an employee's political views is violative of
the First Amendment); see generally Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (stating
that the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his interest in
freedom of speech).
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in the academic context, though it has permitted regulations of speech designed
to maximize variety in broadcast settings.' 21 It remains an open question
whether a university could exercise viewpoint discrimination in the hiring of
faculty, not for the purpose of suppressing unpopular ideas, but for the purpose
of promoting a balanced and diverse assemblage of views among its faculty. 122
Moreover, it is not even settled whether a public librarian may consider the
viewpoints expressed in books in order to assemble a balanced collection of
reading materials. Though there is at least some basis for believing that this
kind of management is constitutional.12 3 The second form of management,
intended to fashion a particular form of discourse, raises similarly unsettled
issues. Certainly, the routine practices of academic institutions, including public
institutions, involve this kind of management. Moreover, it is hard to imagine
an academic institution that did not attempt to manage discourse in this way. At
the most basic level, instructors critique the discourse of students, and
121 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the Federal
Communication Commission's "fairness doctrine," which required broadcasters to provide an
opportunity for the expression of contrasting viewpoints); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 596 (1990), ovemded by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (upholding FCC regulations granting preferential treatment for certain minority-owed
broadcast stations). The scarcity of broadcast frequencies has supported the Court's
willingness to allow regulations of broadcast media that would not be permitted for other
forms of communication. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388. On regulation of the broadcast
medium, see generally HUGH CARTER DONAmHE, Tm BATrLE TO CONTROL BROADCAST
NEws: WHO OWNS THm FIRST Ar4ENDME T? (1989); LucAs A. POwE, AMmucAN
BROADCASnNG AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987).
122 Q. Aleinikoff, supra note 37, 1090 n.143:
Arguably, it would be possible to construct a program dedicated to increasing
diversity that does not draw an explicit race line. The FCC might, for example, review
the content of broadcasters' proposed programming. But such a policy would create
difficult evaluation, monitoring, and enforcement problems and, as Justice Brennan notes
in Metro Broadcasting, would raise serious First Amendment issues as well.
(citation omitted).
123 See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 616 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (recognizing the
Court's precedents which allow the FCC to seek to diversify the number of competing
licensees and to encourage the presentation of various views); Smolla, supra note 22, at 959-
60 (suggesting that a university might deliberately attempt to maintain a mix of views on its
faculty and that government may, in managing other government forums or dispensing
benefits, seek to increase the diversity of ideas presented under its auspices). But see Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 585 (suggesting that attempts to promote broadcast diversity by
regulating programming content directly would pose serious First Amendment issues); id. at
616-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court has never upheld a broadcasting measure
designed to amplify a distinct set of views or the views of a particular class of speakers.").
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academics critique the discourse of one another. Every examination and every
peer review process is a form of content discrimination that would be
constitutionally troublesome in other contexts. The U.S. Supreme Court has
accepted some degree of discourse management as consistent with First
Amendment values, but it has been equally clear that there are limits to the
ability of public institutions to pursue educational visions that entail abridging
normally understood First Amendment values. 124
All this suggests that the university is not quite as cozy with the First
Amendment marketplace of ideas as Justice Powell's Bakke opinion seemed to
suggest. Even if we assume that a university might undertake diversity
management and discourse management without trespassing upon constitutional
values, both forms of management are, at the least, in tension with traditional
First Amendment norms. A realization of this tension should have tempered
Justice Powell's readiness to label the university's professed interest in
educational diversity a compelling one, based upon a simplistic view of the
affinity between academic freedom and First Amendment values. The
university's use of race as a way of fostering educational diversity essentially
seeks permission to employ a suspect classification for professed ends that it
does not precisely seek.125 The appropriate constitutional conclusion to be
drawn under these circumstances might well be that the government's asserted
124 In Widnar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), for example, the Court declared that a
university's stated institutional mission of providing secular education to its students did not
relieve the university of the obligation to adhere to constitutional norms. Id. at 268. In that
case, the Court invalidated the university's attempt to allow a variety of organizations to use
university property but to exclude religious organizations from this use. See also University of
Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (declining to allow a university's claim of academic
freedom to insulate it from inquiry as to whether it had engaged in racial or gender
discrimination); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (finding that a university is
prohibited from denying official recognition of a student organization simply because it found
the organization's views abhorrent); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1963) (finding that students cannot be "confined to the expression of those sentiments that are
officially approved").
125 Compare Justice O'Connor's observations about the race-conscious program at issue
in Metro Broadcasting:
The asserted interest [of the FCC] is in advancing the Nation's different "social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences," yet of all the varied
traditions and ideas shared among our citizens, the FCC has sought to amplify only those
particular views it identifies through the classifications most suspect under equal
protection doctrine. Even if distinct views could be associated with particular ethnic and
racial groups, focusing on this particular aspect of the Nation's views calls into question
the Government's genuine commitment to its asserted interest.
497 U.S. at 621 (citations omitted).
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interest in educational diversity is not really compelling.
D. Religious Belief and Diversity
The use of second order proxies such as race to create a lively forum of
debate and learning appears suspect enough to fail strict scrutiny. But most
universities not only rely on these relatively poorly fashioned proxies, they
ignore other proxies for viewpoint and perspective that are at least as
reasonable as race. 126 One such proxy is religious belief. The religious
affiliations of potential students or faculty are likely to be as significant an
indicator of the kinds of intellectual diversity to which they might contribute as
are their racial or ethnic backgrounds. 127 Moreover, in some academic
contexts-the composition of university faculty, for example-there is cause to
believe that religious diversity is as scarce as racial diversity. 128 Yet the
diversity movement has been singularly silent with respect to the religious
inclusiveness of educational institutions. 129 For example, Professor Carl C.
Monk as Executive Vice President of the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) reasserted in 1994 the value of diversity in legal education. "It is not
possible in our increasingly diverse society, and in an increasingly global
economy, to offer quality legal education without the many cultures of our
126 See J. Harvie Willdnson, III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism
in Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REv. 993, 1016 (1995) (complaining that diversity has
been artificially narrowed to mean little more than race).
127 See Carrington, supra note 19, at 1142; Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy,
and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059, 2060 (1996). When one hears that American
law schools are "inching their way toward 'looking like America,'" Michael Rooke-Ley,
SALT Speaks Out on Diversity, Inclusion and the Promise of "Affirmative Action", SALT
EQUALIzER 1 (Summer 1995), one suspects that the reliance on this optical metaphor is not a
mere happenstance. It highlights visible traits of difference without showing concern for
unseen differences, such as those of religious belief.
128 See Volokh, supra note 127, at 2072.
129 See, e.g., Foster, supra note 15, at 109 ("Diversity has been used as a code word for
a variety of differences including, but not limited to, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual
orientation, physical capacity, ideas, and scholarship."). Occasionally someone notices the
absence of religion from the standard lists, but then assures us that we should find no
significance in this omission. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The
Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1625, 1628 (1990) (noting
the absence of mandated diversity requirements for religion, sexual orientation, and disability
in the AALS bylaws, but observing that the exclusion of reference to diversity of sexual
orientation and that "the omission of religion and disability, should not suggest that
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or religion or disability is any less
important than nondiscrimination based on the other categories listed"). For the AALS
diversity requirement, see supra note 19.
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society being adequately represented in the classroom. The voices of different
cultures bring to the classroom important perspectives that differ from those of
the white majority." 130 To the end that law schools appropriately represent the
full breadth of cultural diversity, Professor Monk suggested that:
Racial and ethnic diversity of the student body and faculty is essential to
quality legal education, but schools also, quite appropriately, consider a variety
of other factors-such as state residency, prior work experience, economic
disadvantage, evidence of leadership and public service, undergraduate major,
and undergraduate institution-in making their admissions decisions.131
Professor Duncan Kennedy has similarly articulated a "cultural pluralist"
case for affirmative action in law school faculty hiring. 132 He argues that "we
should structure the competition of racial and ethnic communities and social
classes in markets and bureaucracies, and in the political system, in such a way
that no community or class is systematically subordinated. 133 If a law school
aims to replicate the wide diversity reflected in American society, whether of
cultural memberships generally or of membership within subordinated
communities, both these lists are most noticeable for their lack of reference to
religious diversity and religious subordination. 134 This omission appears to track
a broader lack of interest in including religious voices within the spectrum of
130 Carl C. Monk, Reaffirming the Need for Diversity at Law Schools, 138 NEw JERSEY
L.J. 14 (1994).
131 Id.
132 D. Kennedy, supra note 18, at 705.
133 Id. at 712. See also Brest & Oshige, supra note 15, at 872 (suggesting that
institutions concerned with enhancing the educational benefits of diversity "might seek
students with diverse cultural backgrounds, or work, travel, and public service experiences");
Foster, supra note 15, at 108-09 (describing a diversity "movement" on university campuses
in which "diversity" is a "code word" for differences including "race, ethnicity, gender,
sexual orientation, physical capacity, ideas, and scholarship"). For a treatment of cultural
diversity which does not omit the religious dimension, see JILL NoRGREN & SERENA NANDA,
AMERICAN CULTURAL PLURAUSM AND LAW 97-171 (2d ed. 1996).
134 Consider, for example, whether members of particular religious groups might be
"salient" in the sense used by Brest and Oshige:
In deciding whom to include in an affirmative action program, a law school might
appropriately consider the salience of the group in contemporary America or in the
geographic region in which its graduates tend to practice. Among the determinants of a
group's salience are its numerical size and the extent to which its culture differs from the
dominant culture of students attending the school.
Brest & Oshige, supra note 15, at 873 (emphasis in original).
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diversity now frequently advocated for academia generally. 135
This variant treatment of race and religion can hardly be justified as
constitutionally compelled. Both religion and race are suspect classifications. 136
If the interest in diversity of viewpoint and perspective is sufficient to allow
race-conscious admissions and hiring decisions it is sufficient to allow religion-
conscious decisions that serve the same purpose. 137 As long as the purpose and
effect of a religion-conscious diversity program is not to prefer a particular
religion over another or to generally prefer religion over non religion, the
Establishment Clause should not pose any barrier to religion-consciousness not
135 See Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 2061, 2062 n.7 (1992) (book review) ("[A]Imost none of the contemporary demands for
greater diversity of voices within the academy include a call for a greater presence of the
almost totally absent sound of a strong religious sensibility."). See also Sanford Levinson,
Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, "Equal Concern and Respect, " and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, 27 U. RICH. L. Rnv. 989, 996 (1993):
I also know that my life in the elite legal academy has been basically devoid of
contact committed Christians, especially evangelical Protestants. One can count literally
on the fingers of one hand the number of publicly visible Protestant evangelicals who
hold tenured positions at America's "leading" law schools. In this respect (and,
undoubtedly, many others), no elite law school even remotely "looks like America," at
least if that is meant to suggest that members of various sub-cultures of American society
should actively participate in each of the institutional structures that comprise that
society.
Professor Gary Peller has suggested a link between the legal movements which displaced
segregation and state-sponsored prayer in public schools. "The logic of the joint rejection of
school segregation and school prayer," he writes, "was contained in the sense that each
reform reflected a progressive move from ignorance and parochialism to enlightenment and
equality, from the particular and biased to the universal and objective." Peller, supra note 24,
at 780-81. The current movement in favor of diversity challenges-at least from the
perspective of race-the ideas of universality and objectivity. The diversity movement denies
the existence of a neutral perspective from which to observe in detachment competing racial
factions and seeks instead to guarantee a voice for each particularism. But the diversity
movement, while championing the cause of racial particularism, seems happy to accept the
continued displacement of religious particularity from public institutions. This is especially
troublesome in view of the longstanding awareness of the reality of discrimination against
both racial and religious minorities. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938).
136 See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (including as examples of
suspect classifications race, religion, and alienage). For a general comparison of the
constitutional treatment of race and religion, see Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under
the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 491 (1994).
137 See Volokh, supra note 127, at 2070-76.
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
already posed by the Equal Protection Clause. 138 In fact, any deliberate attempt
to exclude religious voices from a public space when other viewpoints and
perspectives are admitted would clearly violate the free speech guarantee. 139
What construction should be placed, then, upon academic commitment to
the use of race as a proxy for viewpoint and perspectives in academic
communities and virtual silence concerning comparable use of religion as a
proxy? A possible response might be that the use of race is intended to include
within academic institutions perspectives generally subordinated within the
broader society, and that religious viewpoints are not generally subordinated in
the same way. This response is essentially the same as the response given to the
occasional grumbling that if law schools really wanted to be diverse they should
hire more conservative republicans. 140 Consider the following fictional account
of a discussion concerning law school hiring:
When Harold finished, Jessica said, "What about our need for affirmative
action?"
"Sure," replied Harold, "I can see we need more conservative republicans
on this faculty; that view is underrepresented here." Jessica wasn't sure what to
do. She could see this would be a losing battle. Should she try to explain to
Harold that under-representation of women and minorities on law faculties was
not the same thing as not having a republican majority on the faculty? Would
Harold be able to see that the republican view-point was easily accessible to
students everywhere in American culture-in the news, on the radio? The
mainstream culture was in no danger of being underrepresented. It was the
viewpoint of those outside of that culture that was in danger of being
unheard. 141
138 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (stating that the establishment
clause prohibits laws which "aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another").
139 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(invalidating a University of Virginia policy which allowed payment from the Student
Activities Fund for printing costs of various student publications, but declined to make such
payments for printing costs of a religiously oriented student publication); Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (invalidating a school district's
policy which allowed various groups to use school facilities but prohibited such use for
religious purposes); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (invalidating university's
exclusion of religious groups from using university facilities made available to a variety of
other groups).
140 See Paulsen, supra note 32, at 1001.
141 Wildman, supra note 129, at 1634-35. There are other possible objections to this
lament. To those for whom "diversity" in higher education is not so much about assembling a
diverse range of perspectives as it is about "weakening the white male hegemony in
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Perhaps, like those of conservative republicans, the views of religious
believers are part of the mainstream culture and "easily accessible." There are
two problems with this argument. First, it portrays a shocking failure to
appreciate the diversity among religious believers-a classic example of being
unable to distinguish between the members of groups other than one's own.
One does not expect to hear this clumsy failure to appreciate difference from
advocates of diversity. The views of some religious believers are well
represented within some institutions of public life; the views of other religious
believers are represented in virtually no institutions of public life. Second, the
pure diversity argument in the educational context champions the value of the
interaction of ideas within the academic community. It does no good to say that
views are accessible to students outside the academic institution. The question is
whether those views are being brought to bear upon the subject matter of the
academic enterprise. Here, conservative republicanism distinguishes itself from
religious belief. Conservative republicanism tends to find expression in most
robust exchanges of ideas. Religious perspectives, however, rarely do find
expression in the robust exchange of ideas.
To the extent that universities really do rely on race as a proxy to increase
the diversity of viewpoints and perspectives, another possible explanation is that
this use of race-consciousness yields viewpoints and perspectives with which the
modem university is generally comfortable, or at least on speaking terms. A
comparable use of religion as a proxy for obtaining diversity would, I suspect,
cause universities to admit deliberately viewpoints not well favored within most
academic settings. Of course, public universities cannot purposefully exclude
such viewpoints without running afoul of both the First Amendment's strong
bias against content discrimination of speech and the Free Exercise Clause's
comparable ban against official action which targets particular religious beliefs
for unfavorable treatment. Consequently, unwelcome viewpoints-those of
evangelical Protestants, perhaps, or Mormons or conservative Catholics-will
inevitably penetrate the academic citadel. But these viewpoints need not be
consciously sought after, such as would be the case if religion were used as a
proxy for creating real intellectual diversity among the student body and the
faculty of academic institutions. By this reasoning, the use of race but not
religion as a proxy hides a covert viewpoint discrimination that hardly justifies
denomination as furthering a compelling government interest.
Another face to be put on this discordant treatment of race and religion is
that diversity of viewpoint and perspective among students and faculty is not
really the educational priority that it is sometimes credited with being and that it
universities," the attribute of white maleness may override any other feature of difference.
See Peter M. Shane, Why Are So Many People So Unhappy? Habits of Thought and
Resistance to Diversity in Legal Education, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1033, 1038 (1990).
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is certainly not a compelling interest.' 42 1 do not mean that universities do not
care about diversity, only that the diversity they care about is somewhat
removed from the raucous marketplace of ideas championed by the First
Amendment. Academic institutions make no pretensions of being the equivalent
of open-air parks where street preachers and political radicals shout at one
another. There are any number of reasons why universities believe racial
diversity and racial inclusiveness is important. Unfortunately, most of these
reasons have either been rejected by the United States Supreme Court as
inappropriate bases for race-conscious decisionmaking' 43 or are for one reason
or another less attractive grounds for using race in admissions and hiring
processes.
In response to this reasoning, one might argue that other personal
characteristics which contribute to a diverse academic environment will
typically find representation within a student body or faculty, and that race
alone must be made the subject of more diligent efforts of diversification. 14 4
142 Professor Volokh suggests that:
[Excluding religion as a factor but including race.., might also suggest, as
underinclusiveness often does, that the actual purpose of the program isn't really the
stated purpose; here the real purpose isn't actual diversity of experiences, outlooks, and
ideas as such, but rather something else-perhaps just racial or ethnic diversity, a
justification that Powell's Bakke opinion specifically condemned.
Volokh, supra note 127, at 2075-76 (footnote omitted).
143 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989) ("To
accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid
racial preferences... would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional
provision whose central command is equality."); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous
a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy."); Regents of the Univ. of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) ("mhe purpose of helping certain groups [who are]
perceived as victims of 'societal discrimination' does not justify a classification that imposes
disadvantages upon persons... who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the
beneficiaries of the program... are thought to have suffered.").
144 For comments on achieving diversity in a law school setting, consider:
Of course, race and ethnicity are by no means the only aspects of difference that
law students should encounter. However, the luck of the draw, supplemented by a
general policy of seeking students with different backgrounds and life experiences, will
achieve diversity in almost every important respect except race and ethnicity.
Brest & Oshige, supra note 15, at 863 n.26. I have not omitted any citation for this assertion
because none was made. For a similar defense of attempts to focus diversity efforts on
women and racial minorities, Shane asserts:
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Although this argument might be legitimate in some academic contexts, the
argument seems flatly implausible in other contexts. For example,
undergraduate admissions may embrace a wide variety of religious beliefs, but
faculty composition does not. Consequently, the blanket use of race, but not
religion, as a diversity proxy in both of these settings demonstrates, at the least,
a failure or narrow focus that cannot be reconciled with normal applications of
strict scrutiny. We should, in fact, turn more directly to this issue of narrow
tailoring because it compounds the constitutional difficulties surrounding race-
conscious admissions and hiring programs.
E. Diversity and the Narrow Tailoring Requirement
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion determined that the use of racial quotas in
an admissions process was not a narrowly tailored means of attaining the state's
interest in diversity but that the consideration of race as one among many
factors in the process was a narrowly tailored means of attaining diversity. 145
According to Justice Powell, the reservation of a particular number of seats for
minority applicants actually hindered the attainment of the "genuine diversity"
of viewpoints in which the state had a compelling interest. 146 Justice Powell
justified his sanction of the use of race as a "plus" factor by arguing that, unlike
an actual racial quota, no facial intent to discriminate on the basis of race was
present "where race or ethnic background is simply one element-to be
weighed fairly against other elements-in the selection process." 47 Moreover,
he added:
[A] court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially
nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the
functional equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith would be
presumed in the absence of a showing to the contrary in the manner permitted
To give priority to the need for racial or sexual diversification does not make one
insincere in advocating the impact of diversity generally on the institution's sense of what
counts as knowledge or scholarly activity. It is not hypocritical to treat diversity as a
general good and also to assign higher value to the recruitment of more faculty of color
than to the recruitment, say, of sociobiologists.
Shane, supra note 141, at 1038.
145 438 U.S. 265, 316-19 (1978).
146 Id. at 315.
147 Id. at 317-18. This distinction has been characterized by some commentators as pure
sophism. See JOHN C. JEFF IES, JR., JusncE LEWIS F. PowE.L, JR. 476-77, 484 (1994);
Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L.
REv. 1854, 1875 (1995).
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by our cases. 148
In the first place, Justice Powell's attempt to distinguish between a racial
quota and the use of race as a "plus" factor is simply untenable. A state policy
authorizing the consideration of race as a "plus" factor in an admissions process
is certainly a facial classification on the basis of race. The characterization that
the use of race as a "plus" factor is facially discriminatory is not altered simply
because this discrimination takes place in connection with other classifying
devices. Moreover, reliance on race as a classification device by state officials
would constitute racially discriminatory administration even without the
existence of an official policy.' 49
In the second place, Justice Powell's presumption of good faith on behalf of
government officials runs contrary to an oft-cited purpose of strict scrutiny: to
"smoke out" illegitimate racial classifications. 150 Justice Powell's generous
presumption is reminiscent of the deference to military authorities that
148 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (citations omitted).
149 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding the discriminatory
administration of the local zoning ordinance unconstitutional).
150 In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., the Court held that:
Mhe purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so
closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). See also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 ("The point of carefully
examining the interest asserted by the government in support of a racial classification, and the
evidence offered to show that the classification is needed, is precisely to distinguish legitimate
from illegitimate uses of race in governmental decision making.").
Some observers have been outright skeptical of the suggestion that universities will
simply consider race as one among several factors likely to enhance diversity among their
student bodies. Justice Scalia, for example, expressed his skepticism that any race or sex
consideration is used only as a plus factor when he described Bakke as:
Mhe requirement of willing suspension of disbelief that is currently a credential for
reading our opinions in the affirmative-action field... [such as Bakke] which demanded
belief that the University of California took race into account as merely one of the many
diversities to which it felt it was educationally important to expose its medical students in
the face of a plan obviously designed to force promoting [students] to prefer candidates
from the favored racial and sexual classes.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 673 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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buttressed the Court's egregious reasoning in Korematsu v. United States,151 but
wholly inconsistent with modem notions of strict scrutiny. Rigorous review of
racial classifications assures that the classifications are not motivated by
"illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simply racial politics." 152 For this
reason, the connection between the state's compelling interest and the means
chosen to achieve those ends must be close. 153 Yet, it is this precision in the
connection between racial classifications and educational diversity that is starkly
absent from Justice Powell's blessing on the use of race as a factor in the
admissions process. So long as this process was not operated "as a cover for the
functional equivalent of a quota system,"154 Justice Powell was prepared to call
it a judicial day insofar as "rigorous" review of a suspect classification was
concerned. Moreover, he was willing to leave unresolved crucial questions
about the use of race as a "factor" in the admissions process. 155 What weight,
for example, may officials give to the characteristic of race, and how should it
be compared with other personal characteristics? Is the presence of a diverse
group of students actually a compelling governmental interest in all the various
departments of the modem university?156 These questions find no answer in
Justice Powell's opinion because he employed a variant of strict scrutiny
curiously unconcerned with such specifics. 157 In fact, the scrutiny he employed
151 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the military order which excluded Japanese
Americans from the west coast during World War B).
152 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
617 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overnded by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
153 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection
between justification and classification.").
154 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
155 Justice Blackmun observed candidly that one could achieve the same results by using
race as a "plus" factor as by using a racial quota: "the cynical... may say that under a
program such as Harvard's [using race as a plus factor] one may accomplish covertly what
Davis [using racial quotas] concedes it does openly." Id. at 406. On the conclusory linkage
between race and diversity in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, see David Chang,
Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservativism or
Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. Rfv. 790, 838 (1991).
156 Sanford Levinson suggests that diversity might have less benefit in some departments
than others. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 116. Although Justice Powell denied that the
universty in Bakke had made the kind of findings necessary to use race as a proxy for
accomplishing the state's interest in remedying prior racial discrimination, he simply assumed
that race was an appropriate proxy for achieving educational diversity. See Chang, supra note
155, at 838 n.163.
157 See Mark H. Grnnewald, Quotas, Politics, and Judicial Statesmanship: The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and Powell's Bakke, 49 WAsH. & LEEL. REv. 53, 62 (1992).
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is not "strict" in any recognizable form.
I do not mean, though, to suggest that Justice Powell's pale version of strict
scrutiny is somehow unique. More recent defenders of the diversity rationale
admit more candidly that the application of this rationale in practice involves
seemingly "arbitrary" distinctions. 158 Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige, for
example, attempt to address the issue of which groups should be made the
beneficiaries of affirmative action programs in law school admissions and in
hiring contexts. They acknowledge frankly that "[any diversity or affirmative
action policy is likely to reflect the local history of a particular institution and is
bound to be somewhat arbitrary with respect to the groups it includes. " 159 They
attempt to analyze which groups should be the beneficiaries of affirmative
action programs but ultimately admit that "the data marshaled... can do little
beyond informing one's intuitions on some very fundamental questions" and
that "[a]s is often true with respect to matters of law and policy, the allocation
of the burden of proof makes all the difference."'16 If the burden of proof does
in fact make all the difference, then, as far as the application of strict scrutiny is
concerned, the matter is settled. Once a claimant demonstrates facts justifying
the application of strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving both
the presence of a compelling governmental interest and that the means chosen
to achieve this interest are narrowly tailored. 161
The diversity rationale, once exposed to the "smoking out" function of
strict scrutiny, should not survive constitutional challenge because it creates a
zone of discretion within which unconstitutional motivations can conceal
themselves. For example, no one who reads law review articles can be unaware
of the widespread dissatisfaction with the Court's determination that the
158 See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 140 (discussing the need for organizations to consider
the expected benefits and costs of diversity programs, but noting that "in practice, we haven't
a clue how to measure these benefits and costs directly"); Note, supra note 81, at 1362
(noting that the benefits of educational diversity "cannot be quantified or verified by scientific
proof"). For an attempt to study the various institutional factors that influence university
learning, including an institution's commitment to educational diversity, see generally
ALExANDER W. AsrN, WHAT MAnrRs IN COLLEGE?: FOUR CRmcAL YEARs REvITED
(1993).
159 Brest & Oshige, supra note 15, at 856.
160 Id. at 899.
161 See, e.g., Bemal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984) ("To satisfy strict scrutiny the
state must show ... a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically
available."). See also City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)
(referring to the city's failure to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest Jusftiring an
affirmative action program). See generally James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerymandering and
Vote Dilution: Shaw v. Reno in Doctrinal Context, 26 RurGERS L.J. 517, 589-92 (1995)
(discussing the burden of proof under strict scrutiny).
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remedying of generalized social discrimination against minorities is not a
sufficiently compelling interest to justify race-conscious policies 62 . The
diversity rationale offers a fine cloak for pursuing these policies.' 63 In addition,
the diversity rationale offers a convenient means of sidestepping the Supreme
Court's hostility to generalized attempts to remedy what it has termed "societal
discrimination," as opposed to specifically identified instances of discrimination
by an official actor. Decisionmakers frustrated by this hostility can, without
significant intellectual contortion, easily cloak their enthusiasm for overcoming
past and present social discrimination against particular minorities under a
commitment to "diversity.'1 64 Justice Powell's Bakke opinion restrained the use
162 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence mI, Race, Multiculturalism, and the
Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REv. 819, 821 (1995) (disapproving of
the Supreme Court's position on "societal discrimination"); Deborah C. Malamud,
Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. CoLo. L. REv. 939
(1997) (emphasizing the continued relevance of societal discrimination as a justification
for affirmative action policies); Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of
Affirmative Action, 2 MICH. J. RACE L. 51, 63 (1996) (objecting to the Supreme Court's
rejection of societal discrimination as a basis for remedial action).
163 See PAUL E. PET ON, A Politically Correct Solution to Racial Classification, in
CLASSIFYING BY RACE 7 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1995) ("Powell came very close to giving
constitutional sanction to public hypocrisy as policy."). The asserted "fraud" of race-
conscious admissions programs has been a regular refrain of Professor Lino Graglia. See
Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood.- A Plea to End the "Affirmative Action" Fraud, 2 TEx. F. Civ.
Lm. & Civ. RTs. 105 (1996); Lino A. Graglia, Podberesky, Hopwood, and Adarand-
Implications for the Future of Race-Based Programs, 16 N. IL. U. L. REv. 287, 289 (1996)
(describing Justice Powell's formulation in Bakke as "little more than an invitation to fraud");
Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas: Racial Preferences in Higher Education Upheld and
Endorsed, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79, 87 (1995) ("If universities are free to discriminate at all to
admit members of preferred groups, they will, as a practical matter, be able to discriminate to
whatever extent is necessary to admit the desired numbers.").
164 See Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL.
L. REV. 87, 122 (1979):
I have yet to find a professional academic who believes the primary motivation for
preferential admissions has been to promote diversity in the student body for the better
education of all the students while they are in professional school. Diversity is
undoubtedly one reason for such programs, but the justification of countering the effects
of societal discrimination... comes closer to stating their central purpose ....
See also Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 881, 930 (1996) ("For those who support affirative action but cannot
convince themselves that it is primarily justified by anything other than remedying past
discrimination or distributive justice, the diversity fig leaf exists as a pretext."); Shane, supra
note 141, at 1037 (suggesting that universities took Bakke's lesson to be "the importance of
not appearing to be too conspicuously interested in particular numbers of minority students on
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of rigid quotas for racial minorities, but scarcely disturbed at all the ability of
those who favor a generous policy toward "benign" discrimination on behalf of
racial minorities from accomplishing their aims.1 65
Justice Powell also failed to consider whether the state's interest in
achieving educational diversity could be obtained without considering race as a
"plus" factor in the admissions process. 166 Estimations of the likely
consequences of abolishing racial preferences in admissions tend to be stated in
stark terms:
Absent a radical redesign of admissions criteria, an end to affirmative
action would leave many of the nation's law schools-especially the most
selective ones-with a largely white and (increasingly) East Asian student
body, and with few African American, Latino, and Native American students.
Both for educational and for broader social reasons, such a result strikes us as
highly undesirable-catastrophic would not be too strong a word 67
campus. 'Diversity' ... became the code word for... increasing representation within
faculties and student bodies of women and of people of color, and making university
environments and curricula more cognizant of and responsive to the experiences of often
marginalized groups").
165 See Chen, supra note 20, at 1847 (stating that scholars in favor of affirmative action
policies "exhibit a remarkable faith in the ability of politicians, bureaucrats, and educators to
act 'benignly'").
166 California's public colleges and universities, for example, barred by the University
Regents from considering race as a factor in admissions, have decided to focus instead on
social disadvantage as an important factor in the admissions process. It is not clear, though,
whether frustrated advocates of affirmative action programs will be able to craft race-neutral
policies with an intent to benefit certain racial minorities. In Adarand, the majority noted
parenthetically that the case before it "concerns only classifications based explicitly on race,
and presents none of the additional difficulties posed by laws that, although facially race
neutral, result in racially disproportionate impact and are motivated by a racially
discriminatory purpose." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213 (1995).
Proponents of race-conscious admissions programs also contend that the use of social
disadvantage rather than race as a "plus" factor would not assure that educational institutions
would be racially diverse. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 15, at 897-98. In any event, it is
not clear how a socially disadvantaged status could be substituted for race in faculty hiring
decisions.
167 Brest & Oshige, supra note 15, at 858. See also Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and
Distrust: A Connment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1329 (1986)
(suggesting that access for African American students to universities would be "drastically
narrowed" in the absence of affirmative action programs). For a more general argument that
the use of race neutral classifications seldom achieve the goal of alleviating racial
subordination, see Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality
of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 162,
177-82 (1994). But see Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of
[Vol. 59:551
EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY
This appraisal, and others like it,168 tend to emphasize the lack of racial
diversity that will exist in universities if they are stripped of the ability to
consider race as a positive factor in the admissions process. But the proper
constitutional inquiry, suggested by Justice Powell's focus on the compelling
governmental interest in educational diversity, is whether a diversity of outlooks
and perspectives requires race-conscious decisionmaking. Furthermore, the
inquiry should attend to whether other non race-conscious admissions and
hiring criteria might produce the educational diversity desired. 169 For example,
the texts chosen to be studied in an academic setting may well contribute as
much or more to intellectual diversity as the identities of the faculty and
students. 170
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 32 (arguing that
redefining preferences in terms of the underprivileged rather than in racial or ethnic terms
would not greatly impair the impact on the intended class of beneficiaries).
The diversity rationale may actually impose a ceiling on the achievement of racial
minorities by justifying rejection of minority candidates whose applications exceed their
proportional numbers in the relevant population.
[B]ecause the role model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to the harm
caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to escape the
obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the small percentage of black teachers
by reference to the small percentage of black students.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion). For the
suggestion that race-conscious admissions programs have perpetuated a kind of "groupthink"
which actually undermines real diversity on university campuses, see Nat Hentoff, The Truth
About Those "Diverse" Campuses, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 27, 1996, at A23.
168 See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Hopwood. Was This the African-American Nightmare or
the African-American Dream?, 2 TEx. F. Civ. Lm. & Civ. Rrs. 97 (1996).
169 See Volokh, supra note 127, at 2068 (suggesting that differences other than race
already make educational institutions intellectually diverse). See, for example, Roy Brooks's
proposal of "whole person" admissions policies, which-as between roughly comparable
students-prefers those who have demonstrated greater self-determination and character. RoY
L. BRooKs, INTEGRATION OR SEPARAION?: A STRATEGY FOR RAciAL EQuAmy 236-37
(1996). Brooks also suggests using a race-neutral admissions preference for students who are
willing to work after graduation in socioeconomically depressed areas. See id. at 237-39.
170 Carrington suggests that:
Nearly all of us who have not had it will learn more (right or wrong) about the
experience of being female from one novel by Jane Austen than by forty-two hours of
legal instruction from a female law professor. Surely more can be learned about the
black experience from reading autobiographical works of Malcolm X, Claude Brown,
James Baldwin, and others, than from hundreds of hours of discourse about law.
Carrington, supra note 19, at 1147.
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The diversity rationale for race-conscious admissions and hiring decisions
suffers the same defect as the role model argument sometimes used to justify
affirmative action policies: it is simply too amorphous a goal to shelter use of a
suspect classification. 171 Moreover, the diversity rationale violates one of the
most often repeated canons of the Supreme Court's affirmative action cases:
that race-conscious remedies must have some temporal ending point. 172 Like
the use of race as a basis for providing role models to minority students in
educational contexts, the diversity rationale allows educational officials to
engage in racial discrimination "long past the point required by any legitimate
remedial purpose." 173 The Supreme Court has suggested in the broadcast
context that diversity programs are not temporally open-ended. 174 However
persuasive this confident declaration might seem in the case of broadcasting, it
is not immediately apparent why it should apply to the educational context.
Simply to be able to describe the circumstances under which race-conscious
programs would no longer be necessary to achieve educational diversity should
hardly count as temporally bounded.
Finally, the diversity rationale may in fact undermine the real quest for
intellectual diversity. Consider Professor Ruth Colker's lament that mechanical
applications of the diversity rationale have resulted in diminished attention to
.the content of her ideas:
I have often been the beneficiary of the "diversity" rationale but grow
171 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion) (finding that the state's asserted
interest in providing role models for minority children was too indefinite a basis for
employing a racial classification). The dissenters in Metro Broadcasting rejected diversity as
"simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for
employing racial classifications." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overrded by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
172 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion) (criticizing racial preferences based
on generalized societal discrimination as allowing remedies that are "ageless in their reach
into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (describing societal discrimination as "an amorphous
concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past"). It is perhaps at this point, as
much as any other, that the Court has departed from the views expressed by many legal
academics who favor the use of race-conscious decisionmaking as a future-oriented tool for
creating a more inclusive society. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 26, at 98 (arguing that "the
benefits of building a racially integrated society for the future can be justification enough" for
affirmative action policies).
173 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (plurality opinion).
174 See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 596 ("Such a goal carries its own natural
limit .... The FCC's plan, like the Harvard admissions program discussed in Bakke,
contains the seed of its own termination.").
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tired of its mechanical application to my situation. Each time that I have been
hired at an academic institution, I am surprised to find out how few members
of the faculty bothered to acquaint themselves with thequahty or substance of
my scholarship. It is easier to say that I diversify the faculty because of my
gender or sexual orientation rather than to ask the more probing question of
whether my gender or sexual orientation have affected my scholarship in ways
that are original and thought-provoking. By contrast, when I have observed the
hiring deliberations for white men, I have seen close attention paid to the
quality of their work.175
Professor Jerome Culp, though supportive of race-conscious admissions
programs, laments the current use of race as a diversifying factor in
universities:
In fact, educational affirmative action plans often take from the pool of
minorities those applicants with the smallest intersection of race and poverty
because such choices require the least investment in seeking out and preparing
people to be students in these institutions. We could find students from among
those with more diverse backgrounds to admit to our schools, but ultimately we
choose not to because this brand of race consciousness is financially and
ideologically expensive. We prefer the mildly race-conscious policy because it
is cheaper and likely to change us the least.176
Other commentators have suggested that the use of race as a proxy for
diversity tends to benefit upper-class minorities' 77 or particular racial and ethnic
minorities over other such minorities. 178 The clumsiness of relying on the proxy
of race or gender in contexts in which more immediate attention to ideas is
possible suggests again that the modem academy is not actually interested in the
"robust exchange of ideas" when it uses race and gender in this way, but is
simply interested in racial or gender diversity.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has pursued a quite narrow aim. I have not attempted to
investigate in a general way the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions
and hiring programs in educational institutions. There are many possible
1 75 COLKER, supra note 87, at 140.
176 Culp, supra note 166, at 178.
177 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 126, at 1014. For a discussion of diversity in terms
of social and economic class, see Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action:
Lessons and Caveats, 74 I-Ex. L. REv. 1847, 1886-87 (1996).
178 See Chin, supra note 163, at 895-901.
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justifications for such programs and this Article has not endeavored to evaluate
all or even most of them. Instead, I have concentrated on one possible
justification, which I have referred to as a "pure" diversity rationale for race-
conscious policies. This rationale I take to be a defense of race-consciousness
simply in terms of its asserted merit as a necessary means of producing a
diversity of viewpoints and perspectives in academic contexts. Of course, the
diversity rationale for race-consciousness need not be untethered from other
considerations. One might supplement this rationale with concern for redressing
past practices of racial discrimination, of distributing important social benefits
in an egalitarian manner, or of using educational institutions as tools to displace
a perceived caste system in which race is alleged to play a crucial part. 179 Some
of these supplemental rationales are themselves constitutionally troublesome
according to the Supreme Court's current precedents and probably would not
rescue a diversity policy if the "pure" diversity rationale itself were found to be
constitutionally inadequate. I have not attempted, though, to enter this more
tangled thicket.
Instead, I have attempted to return to the pure diversity argument
articulated in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion. It is my sense that the reign of
this opinion has allowed scholars and institutions to avoid addressing the very
questions suggested, but not answered, by the previous paragraph. Only by
laying bare the poverty of the pure diversity argument will courts and
commentators be in a position to see whether a more nuanced justification for
race-conscious admission and hiring policies might survive constitutional
scrutiny. As for the sufficiency of the pure diversity argument, I have
concluded that it cannot withstand the rigorous scrutiny now applied to all race-
conscious policies. Without supplementing this rationale with some remedial or
anti-caste principle, for example, it is not possible to explain the academy's use
of race as a diversity proxy rather than other equally plausible or even more
plausible proxies for intellectual viewpoints and perspectives. 180 To proceed
179 So Supplemented, the diversity rationale might continue to support the use of race as
a "plus" factor in admissions in a way comparable to the Supreme Court's continued
willingness to allow some measure of race-consciousness in voter districting. For a
comparison of Bakke and the Court's voter districting cases, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines after Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 588 (1993).
180 It is possible, for example, that an anti-caste principle such as Cass Sunstein has
articulated might provide a basis for distinguishing between religion and race as potential
proxies for admissions and hiring decisions in academic institutions. Perhaps race, more than
religion, has been the basis of systemic disadvantages in this society that public institutions
ought to seek to reverse. A systemic disadvantage, Sunstein suggests, is one "that operates
along standard and predictable lines, in multiple important spheres of life, and that applies in
realms like education, freedom from private and public violence, wealth, political
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with race-conscious policies under these circumstances is to admit into the
academy the unmistakable air of subterfuge.
representation, and political influence, all of which go to basic participation as a citizen in a
democratic society." Sunstein, supra note 84, at 770 (footnote omitted).
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